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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this Thesis is to study the reduction in weapon system Operation 
& Support (O&S) costs from the Project Manager’s perspective.  Specifically, the Thesis 
will study the role of the Project Manager’s Chief Logistician in reducing O&S Costs 
during the developmental phase of the life-cycle.  Conventional knowledge indicates that 
approximately 95% of weapon system’s O&S Costs are committed by decisions made 
prior to its Critical Design Review (CDR).  Given this major assumption, the objective of 
this study is to identify and discuss the key roles of the Chief Logistician prior to the 
CDR, which results in significant reductions to O&S Costs once the system is fielded.   
B. BACKGROUND 
Excessive weapon system Operation and Support (O&S) costs have become one 
of the central issues within the Department of Defense (DOD).  Historically, O&S Costs 
represent 60% to 80% of the total life-cycle cost of weapon systems (DSMC ILS Guide, 
1999).  Consequently, minor increases in O&S Costs across many systems can have 
major impacts on the execution of the over-all defense budget over extended periods of 
time.  Furthermore, the recent pressure to shift funding from O&S accounts to 
development & procurement accounts in order to modernize a rapidly-aging inventory of 
weapons systems have focused intense emphasis on reducing O&S Costs for fielded and 
future weapon systems.    
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question:  What are the key roles of the Chief 
Logistician prior to the Critical Design Review (CDR) that result in significant reductions 
in Operation and Support (O&S) costs once a weapon system is fielded? 
2.  Secondary Research Questions  
a. Prior to the CDR, what are the specific strategic imperatives for 
significant reductions in future O&S Costs? 
b. Prior to the CDR, what are the key "design" activities of the Chief 
Logistician required to reduce future O&S Costs? 
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c. Prior to the CDR, what are the key "planning" activities of the 
Chief Logistician required to reduce future O&S Costs? 
d. What are the principal inhibitors that constrain the Chief 
Logistician in reducing future O&S Costs? 
e. What changes can be made to the Chief Logistician's status during 
developmental programs to enable that person to more effectively reduce future O&S 
Costs?   
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this research is an analysis of established acquisition information 
related to O&S Costs reduction, general initiatives underway to reduce O&S Costs across 
multiple systems, and major weapon programs across the Department of Defense which 
have significant O&S Costs.  The research has a special focus on the DOD-designated 
pilot programs for Reduction in Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC).  A total of 12 DOD R-
TOC pilot programs were studied (four programs for each of the three Services).  A 
cross-section of developmental and fielded weapon systems was selected to balance the 
analysis between existing and predicted O&S Costs.  The research of these weapon 
systems and general initiatives has been conducted within the general context of 
established research data about the early genesis of O&S Costs. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
1. To answer the research questions, I have conducted research in the three 
broad areas of O&S Costs Reduction listed below.  The basic methodology was to a) 
conduct a review of the general acquisition information that directly relates to O&S Cost 
reduction, b) identify and assess the general initiatives underway within DOD which are 
focused on reducing O&S Cost across multiple systems and all Services, and c) conclude 
the research with the detailed review of the O&S Cost reduction efforts on a variety of 
DOD weapon systems.  The last two areas, general initiatives and weapon systems 
initiatives, were grouped by “design” and “planning” since these categories represent the 
two general areas into which O&S Costs reduction efforts can be classified.  From this 
comprehensive analysis the research will formulate a set of key roles that should be 




GENERAL AREAS OF RESEARCH: 
• Acquisition Information related to O&S Costs Reduction  
• General O&S Initiatives applicable to multiple systems 
• Specific O&S Initiatives by various DOD weapon systems. 
 
2. To research these three broad areas, I utilized the following resources: 
a. Department of Defense publications, policies, and directives 
b. Published academic research papers 
c. Internet websites and homepages  
d. Books, periodicals, journals, and other electronic resources 
e. Program management documentation from a specific weapon 
system 
f. Reports, studies, briefings, and analysis on a specific weapon 
system 
F. ORGANIZATION 
This Thesis is divided into five chapters.  Chapter I is the Introduction and 
provides the purpose, scope, methodology, organization, and benefits of the study. 
Chapter II is the Background of O&S costs.  The discussion defines O&S Costs, 
identifies their importance, characterizes the current environment, defines the history of 
recent O&S Cost reduction efforts, and defines the Project Manager’s and Chief 
Logistician’s basic roles in O&S Costs reduction. 
Chapter III is a presentation of O&S Data in three broad areas: general acquisition 
information, general initiatives that apply to multiple systems, and specific data on 
selected weapon systems.  The data in the last two categories is organized into two 
general classifications (design and planning) in order to develop a common baseline for 
data analysis.  These two categories represent the two areas of logistics in which O&S 
Costs are believed to be determined by decisions made in the developmental phases of 
the life-cycle.  
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Chapter IV is the Analysis and has one section for each of the five secondary 
research questions.  The sections will identify and discuss the specific strategic 
imperatives, key "design" activities, key "planning" activities, inhibitors, and needed 
changes to the Chief Logistician's status in reducing O&S Costs. 
Chapter V is the Conclusions and Recommendations which summarizes the 
findings of the research and answers the research questions.   
G. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
The primary benefit of this study is to provide unique insight into the strategic 
reduction of O&S Costs for DOD weapon systems.  The study identified the key roles of 
the person (Chief Logistician) who should be the most qualified to perform this strategic 
task.  Since the highest life-cycle cost (Operation and Support) is determined during a 
short timeframe (Prior to the Critical Design Review) by a single organization (the 
Project Manager’s Office), the ability to define and understand these key roles can have a 
major impact on the efficient use of DOD financial resources over future generations.  
Additionally, the study identified inhibitors and needed changes to the Chief Logistician's 












II.  BACKGROUND OF OPERATION AND SUPPORT (O&S) COSTS 
A. DEFINITION OF O&S COSTS 
O&S Costs are typically defined as a function of time during the life-cycle of a 
particular system.  Before defining O&S Costs, its parent category of life-cycle cost 
should be defined.  The term “life-cycle cost” (LCC) is considered to be "the total cost to 
the Government for acquisition and ownership of a system over its useful life and 
includes the cost of development, acquisition, operation, and support (to include 
manpower) and where applicable, disposal (DSMC, Terms, 2001)."  For defense systems, 
"LCC is also equal to Total Ownership Cost (TOC);" a term often used today to capture 
the totality of weapon systems costs from cradle to grave (DSMC, Term, 2001).  
Consequently, O&S Costs are a subset of LCC TOC and "generally consist of those costs 
which are accumulated after the item is developed, produced, and accepted by the 
Government.  For example, O&S Costs include military pay to operate and maintain 
systems, fuel and consumables, depot maintenance, repair parts, procedures, training, and 
disposal (DSMC, Terms, 2001)."   For this Thesis, only O&S Costs, which are directly 
attributable to a particular weapons system, will be considered.  Figure 3-1 shows the 
life-cycle cost distribution for a typical weapon system.  Milestone I is the beginning of 
the Demonstration & Validation phase; Milestone II is the beginning of Full-Scale 
Engineering Development, and Milestone III is the beginning of Full-Rate Production 
and Fielding.  Under the new DOD acquisition process, these milestones have been re-
named as Milestones A, B, and C with different narratives description.  However, since 
the balance of research materiel relates to the old designations, this Thesis will continue 













Figure 3-1. Life-Cycle Cost of a Typical Weapon System 
 
B. IMPORTANCE OF O&S COSTS 
As previously shown in Figure 3-1, O&S Costs are considered to comprise 
approximately 60% to 80% of a weapon system’s life-cycle costs (DSMC, ILS Guide, 
1999).  Unfortunately, this percentage is rising rapidly due to the aging of the over-all 
force structure and the longer period of time that systems are being kept in the inventory.  
Instead of the traditional rule-of-thumb of a 20 to 30-year service life, the actual 
replacement cycle for military hardware is about 54 years (Augustine, 1994).  Figure 3-2 
displays the expected life-cycle of several DOD systems.  The impact of this large 
extension of system life-cycles has enormous impacts to O&S Costs.  Comparative data 
to other systems indicates that extensions to a service life period of 54 years results in 
O&S Costs rising to 98% of total LCC (McIlvaine, 2000)!  However, this extension does 
not necessarily mean that O&S costs are escalating.  These costs could remain relatively 
constant, but would be additive each year and would naturally comprise a greater 
percentage of LCC over the life-cycle.  Regardless, the control of O&S Costs is the 










                         
 
Figure 3-2.  Defense System Life-Cycles 
C. CURRENT ENVIRONMENT 
1. User OPTEMPO   
Not only is DOD using old equipment, but the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of 
the forces continues to escalate as well. OPTEMPO is the rate, frequency, and extent to 
which our Services engage in military operations.  General Erik Shinseki (Chief of Staff, 
Army) in a February 1998 statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 
observed that “since 1989, the average frequency of Army contingency deployments has 
increased from one every 4 years to one every 14 weeks (Gansler, 2000)." 
2. Modernization Needs  
Because of the aging of the force and the accompanying requirements for high 
readiness to satisfy an increased OPTEMPO, there has been a consistent transfer of 
money from procurement accounts to O&S accounts to satisfy these needs.  This 
diversion of money from modernization accounts to readiness accounts is estimated to be 
$2 billion annually (Pallas, 2000).  The resulting lack of modernization funding means 
that the aging military equipment could not be replaced or improved when desired.  
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modernization accounts.  This conflicting dilemma has been labeled the “death spiral” by 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Dr. Jacques S. 
Gansler (Gansler, 2000).   The net result of this death spiral is that the total procurement 
accounts of DOD have fallen by 70% over the decade of the 1990s (Defense Systems 
Affordability Council, 1999). 
3. Current Inventory of Weapon Systems  
Unfortunately, at least over the coming years, DOD must continue to use these 
current weapon systems.  Most defense analysts agree that the majority of the weapon 
systems we will use over the next two decades are either already fielded or currently 
under development.  For example, nearly 75% of the Army’s systems that will be 
employed in 2010 already exist today (Website, Department of Army, TOC 
Organization).   
4. Inherent Logistics Costs 
The inherent cost of logistics within DOD is another key variable to address.  
Although sometimes difficult to relate to a specific weapon system, the total logistics cost 
within DOD accounts for 64% of their total obligation authority (McIlvaine, 2000).  As a 
parallel effort to reduce the over-all logistics cost of owning specific weapon systems, the 
DOD leadership has developed quantitative goals for reducing the logistics portion of 
total obligation authority from the current 64% to 53% by 2005 (DOD: Into the 21st 
Century, 1999).  Furthermore, this transformation strategy for logistics has two broad 
objectives.  First, reduce the demand for logistics; principally through design activities.  
Second, to improve the ability to perform logistics principally through efficiency and 
effectiveness improvements (Gansler, 1998).  Finally, the infrastructure cost of logistics 
is being aggressively attacked.  Within DOD, a staggering 1.25 million civilians work in 
logistics and support-related jobs while the Services collectively spend approximately 
$80 billion annually on support (Gansler, 2000). 
5. Specific O&S Trends 
The O&S cost growth rates vary by service.  The annual percentage rate for the 
period FY 1960-1999 was 1.9% for the Army, l.6% for the Navy, l.5% for the Air Force, 
and l.l% for the Marines.  Since the military constitutes the highest O&S category, 
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particular attention is paid to the "cost per active-duty personnel."  In FY 00-05, the 
projected cost is $126,300 per person and will continue to grow due to expanded 
personnel benefits, rising health-care costs, and increased demand for personnel-related 
support Services.  Within the over-all O&S cost categories, disturbing trends continued to 
evolve.  While the total O&S costs are only escalating slightly, the ratio expenditures 
between people (military & civilian) and purchases (e.g., parts, depot maintenance) is 
changing significantly.  The "purchases" element continues to rise at the expense of 
"people."  Consequently, pressure will continue in military pay accounts to do operations 










































III.  DATA 
A. RECENT EFFORTS TO REDUCE O&S COSTS 
1.      Baseline Efforts  
            The reduction of O&S Costs has long been a goal of DOD, but has not received 
the same level of attention as other program objectives.  To help remedy this lack of 
focus, DOD has established "supportability as equal to performance, cost, and schedule" 
for the management of any defense weapon program (DOD Directive 5000.1, 2000).  
However, since supportability of weapon systems has historically been the responsibility 
of the Services logistics and materiel commands, the typical Project Manager has 
struggled with the dilemma of how to make supportability "equal in importance" when he 
does not have the supportability mission. 
2. Recognition of O&S Cost Commitment  
           Although Project Managers have not had the responsibility to execute the 
supportability mission, an accepted fact of acquisition indicates that the Project Manager 
is in the best position to determine future operation & support costs.  Figure 4-1 shows 
that approximately 95% of LCC have already been committed by the time a system 
conducts its CDR, although only about 15% of the actual costs have actually been 
incurred.  This 95% accumulation occurs during the phases of the life-cycle when a 
Project Manager (PM) is in-charge of the weapon system's development.  Consequently, 
a PM can utilize numerous developmental activities and tools to significantly impact the 
future O&S Costs for his weapon system.      
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Figure 4-1.  Typical Life-Cycle Cost (LCC) Commitment 
 
3. Recent Initiatives 
Partially as a result of the PM's unique position, a series of recent initiatives have 
given the PM much greater responsibility in the area of supportability and O&S Costs 
reduction.  The recent emphasis is centered around Section 912(c) and Section 816 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 as well as a series of DOD 
policies and directives promulgated in response to this congressional act.  As related to 
this Thesis, this act resulted in the formation of the Defense Systems Affordability 
Council (DSAC) to steer DOD total ownership cost reduction efforts, the designation of 
30 pilot programs (10 per each of the three Services) to lead the efforts in DOD R-TOC, 
and the designation of Project Manager Oversight of Life-cycle Support (PMOLCS) to 
empower the PM with a substantive role in O&S Costs reduction (Pallas, 2000).   As 
parallel efforts, DOD and the various Services have instituted a wide variety of general 
O&S Costs reduction efforts across multiple systems. 
4. Project Manager's Role in O&S Cost Reduction 
 a.        Genesis 
At ground zero of DOD’s recent R-TOC and O&S Costs reduction efforts 
is the Project Manager.  Historically, the PM’s charter has been limited to developing, 
producing, and fielding a weapon system.  This charter included the responsibility to 
design and plan the logistics support system.  After fielding, the responsibility for 
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executing the support of the weapon system fell on the Service’s logistics and materiel 
commands.  This transition point of responsibility has always been a gray area since most 
systems require several years to field.  Furthermore, this extended fielding period 
mandated supportability concurrent with production & fielding and usually involved 
several post-fielding modifications, which were often managed by the PM.  Finally, since 
the PM has been responsible for designing and planning the support system, but not 
executing that mission, an established criticism has been that the PM does not adequately 
consider the implications of support decisions during development since the actual 
impact of those decisions will be the responsibility of the logistics and materiel 
commands.  Consequently, most PM’s have historically been involved in supporting 
weapon systems as a coordinated effort with the Service’s logistics and materiel 
commands.  However, the PM’s specific role has always been clouded by lack of 
clarification on the PM’s specific scope of authority, responsibility, and accountability.  
b.        Recent Policy Statements  
Unfortunately, the recent policy statements have not clarified the PM’s 
specific role.  For example, within the Army, the initial catalysts for PM involvement in 
life-cycle management (Department of Army Memo, 1997) and O&S Costs reduction 
(Department of Army Memo, 1998) were acknowledged in a follow-on DA 
memorandum (Department of Army Memo, 2000) that the previous two memorandums 
“have created confusion regarding the roles and responsibilities of program management 
and sustainment personnel as well as weapon systems transition requirements.”  The 
follow-on memo rescinded the two previous memos, maintained the PMs responsibility 
for life-cycle management, but left this responsibility dependant upon not “jeopardizing 
AMC/MACOM Army-wide readiness and supportability responsibilities.” 
c. The Path Forward in PM Life-Cycle Management and R-TOC 
Reduction  
In spite of these policy issues, the PM remains charged with a complex 
responsibility with limited authority and control.  The 30 pilot programs have become the 
central hub of activity for the PM’s quest to reduce TOC and O&S Costs (Pallas, 2000) 
and will thus form the principal basis from which to conduct the research for this Thesis 
at the weapon system level.  DOD acknowledges these inhibitors and describes the 
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challenges and expectations of the PM in future activities for both new and fielded 
systems (DOD: Into the 21st Century, 1999). 
 
Giving New Authorities to Program Managers of Both New and Fielded Systems:   
Program Managers' accountability for life-cycle issues can be improved by 
increasing visibility into related processes, giving them either direct control or, as a 
minimum, a strong influence over tradeoffs among research and development, 
acquisition, operating, and support costs.  They must be held directly accountable 
for resources they directly control.  Where operational or economic considerations 
dictate sharing of resources, individual Program Managers must be held 
accountable for clear and timely articulation of actions to reduce life-cycle costs of 
their systems.  
 
5. Chief Logistician's Role 
  Although virtually all of the literature today focuses on the PM as the "dragon 
slayer" for O&S Costs reduction, the Project Manager’s task is actually performed by a 
large staff of project office personnel who are both core to the project office and matrixed 
from the supporting commands.  While the PM is the leader and ultimate decision-maker 
of the organization, the vast majority of the actual work is accomplished by this staff of 
40-150 people.  Typically, the Project Manager’s principal action officer for reducing 
O&S Costs is the Chief Logistician.  This individual is a senior civilian or military 
logistician who heads the logistics/support division; one of 3-6 divisions in a typical 
project office.  The Chief Logistician must manage a matrixed group of logisticians 
collocated in the project office as well as provide oversight to a group of non-collocated 
logisticians in the Service’s materiel or logistics command.  The latter presents a 
particularly difficult challenge in that the non-collocated logisticians provide critical 
logistics support in key ILS areas (e.g. Inventory Management, New Equipment Training, 
Publications, Maintenance Engineering) but do not report directly to the Chief 
Logistician.  Within the PM office, the Chief Logistician is charged by the Project 
Manager to manage the entire spectrum of Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) elements 
for the program and to make the necessary recommendations to the PM for efficiently 
designing, producing, fielding, and managing the support system.  Consequently, in the 
same way a Commander-in-Chief charges his divisional commander to execute his 
 15
particular sphere of responsibility, the PM charges the Chief Logistician to reduce the 
future O&S Cost by effectively executing his or her divisional responsibilities.  
Therefore, the remainder of this research will study this topic from the perspective of the 
Chief Logistician but within the context of the Project Manager’s over-all charter to 
reduce O&S Costs as an integral part of the development of a weapon system. 
B. ACQUISITION INFORMATION ON O&S COSTS   
The following data is a synopsis of the general acquisition information related to 
O&S Costs reduction within DOD.  The data is a summary of the most salient 
information, which directly involves the policies, techniques, directives, and procedures 
of O&S Cost reduction.  
1. Past Acquisition Practices 
A substantial amount of acquisition research indicates that current O&S Costs are 
directly attributed to the acquisition practices of the past.  In the 1960 to 1980s 
timeframe, engineering practiced “Lone Ranger Design” through the “Art of Sequential 
Engineering.”  The engineer, operating solo, sequentially designed a system to meet the 
point-design requirements with neither significant involvement of other parties nor an 
assessment of the design’s impact to other disciplines or the life-cycle cost of the system 
(McIlvaine, 2000).  The user’s last involvement was limited to early front-end 
requirements determination and challenges to questionable or flexible requirements were 
strongly discouraged.  Logistics considerations followed and supported whatever the 
engineer created.  When mistakes were made, multiple engineering changes and 
expensive field modifications followed. The result was an ill-conceived, huge, and 
lengthy logistics tail that was both inefficient and frequently ineffective.  Contractor 
support was discouraged, asset visibility was limited, supply chain management 
disintegrated, unplanned overhaul programs and service-life extensions were common, 
and post-production support planning for supply and maintenance was restricted 
(McIlvaine, 2000).  With the developmental pressure to control costs, the Design-to-Cost 
(DTC) climate resulted in logistics considerations being traded-off for near-term 
development needs or production over-runs (Kausal, 1996).  Still, cost over-runs became 
commonplace.  “Despite the implementation of more than two dozen regulatory and 
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administration initiatives” resulting from the Packard Commission’s recommendations to 
reduce cost over-runs, there has “been no substantial improvement in the cost 
performance of defense programs for more than 30 years  (Christensen, 1999)."  
2. Current Acquisition Directives 
The latest 2001 DOD 5000 series contains a major new emphasis on Reduction of 
Total Ownership Costs (R-TOC).  This unprecedented highlighting of the O&S Costs 
arena contains at least five major emphasis areas as listed below.  Furthermore, the 
directive requires that, when reducing total ownership costs,  “cost must be considered as 
a requirement that drives design, procurement, and support (DOD: Briefing: The New 
DOD Systems Acquisition Process, 2000)." 
 
Five Major Emphasis Areas to Reduce Total Ownership Costs: 
• Use Market Research and Commercial Products to increase 
competition 
• Use Open System Architecture to reduce the cost of technology 
insertions 
• Use Dissimilar Competition in non head-to-head alternatives to meet 
capability needs 
• Increase use of Simulation-Based Acquisition to reduce costs for 
hardware prototype 
• Reprocurement Reform based on business case analysis of predicted 
life, technology insertion opportunities, and cost reduction potential. 
 
Furthermore, in response to Section 912c of the National Defense Authorization 
Act of 1998, the Secretary of Defense identified the following major actions for “re-
engineering the sustainment process (Pallas, 2000):" 
 
• Re-engineer the Product Support Process to use Best Commercial 
Practices 
• Competitively support product support 
• Modernize through Spares 
• Establish Project Manager Oversight of Life-Cycle Support 





3. General Measures of Logistics 
One of the first steps in identifying the factors which contribute to O&S Costs 
growth is to first identify the general measures of logistics.  One of the “classic” 
textbooks on Logistics Engineering (Blanchard, 1992) categorizes the measures of 
logistics as listed in Figure 4-2 below.  The data indicates that each of these measures has 
a direct relationship to O&S Costs.   
 
 
Figure 4-2.  General Measures of Logistics 
 
4. Acquisition Logistics        
Military Handbook 502 (MIL-HDK-502) is the principal roadmap for performing 
acquisition logistics.  This guidance-only document provides an excellent framework for 
identifying the various methodologies for reducing O&S Costs as an integral part of the 
systems engineering process.  The handbook indicates the major supportability criteria 
that should always be considered as part of the total system design process are cost, 
equipment readiness, and manpower/personnel constraints (DOD: MIL-HDK-502,1997).  
The areas of the handbook which contained key emphasis on O&S Costs reduction were 
supportability analysis, techniques of developing supportability requirements, critical 
processes, and maintenance planning. 
 
 
General Measures of Logistics (with examples of specific metrics): 
a. Reliability: failure rates of numerous combinations 
b. Maintainability: mean corrective/preventive maintenance times 
c. Supply:  operating level, safety stock, reorder cycle, pipeline 
d. Test & Support Equipment:  quantities, locations, intended function 
e. Organizational: direct maintenance labor times, personnel attrition    
f. Facilities: item turnaround time, facility utilization, total cost per month 
g. Transportation & Handling: capacities, cost per shipment/ton 
h. Software: failure rates, addressability errors, and calculation errors 
i. Availability: inherent, achieved, and operational 
j. Economic: total life-cycle cost, ownership cost, cost growth 
k. Effectiveness: system performance and physical parameters 
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a. Supportability Analysis 
The handbook unequivocally indicates that “supportability is a design 
characteristic” and that “the early focus of supportability analysis should result in the 
establishment of support-related parameters or specification requirements” which are 
“expressed quantitatively and qualitatively."  Consequently, achieving affordable system 
support is a “result of sound systems engineering."  To meet this objective, the 
supportability analyses should accomplish the following two broad objectives: 
 
1st:  Ensure Supportability is a Performance Requirement.  Supportability 
requirements are “not to be stated as distinct logistics elements, but instead as 
performance requirements that relate to the system’s operational effectiveness, 
operational suitability, and life-cycle cost reduction.”  The initial output should 
be an integrated Operational Requirements Document (ORD) which reflects the 
operational and support concept.  From this ORD, the supportability analysis 
should define the “key supportability factors” which most significantly impact 
the system.  In general, these factors include deployment, mobility, mission 
frequency and duration, human systems integration, anticipated service life, 
standardization and interoperability, and supportability risks. 
 
2nd:  Ensure Optimal Support System Design.  The key is to design the system 
with a balance between the total system and support.  The balance is a function 
of neither maximizing or minimizing the other, but seeks to develop an optimum 
point at which supportability is in-balance with the remainder of the system 
elements.  The specific “design influence for supportability” activities vary by 
system and are a product of the logistics requirements defined in the following 
section.  
b. Supportability Requirements 
The beginning point for each supportability requirement should be found 
in an operational requirement.  The regulatory guidance for preparation of the 
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) requires that every paragraph, except for the 
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paragraph on "threat," should contain logistics information.  The specific ORD areas 
which should include supportability requirements include the general description of the 
operational capability, the readiness rates, maintenance plans, mean down time in 
operational environments, support equipment, human systems integration, stockage levels 
of materiel, computer resources, transportation, standardization, and interoperability 
(DOD: MIL-HDK-502, 1997).  Figure 4-3 summarizes the typical reliability and 
maintainability requirements for weapon systems. 
 
Figure 4-3.  Typical Reliability and Maintainability Requirements 
 
The handbook defines at least two major challenges for the logistician in 
accomplishing this "design influence" activity.  First, the supportability requirements must be 
expressed in performance terms and not direct “how” they are to be achieved.  These 
performance specifications have revolutionary impacts on the logistics community, which 
has always relied upon detailed Government-controlled specifications.  The implementation 
of performance specifications into the logistics world continues to evolve, but is riddled with 
numerous difficulties.  Second, the logistician must resolve inevitable conflicts with the 
design engineers over trade-offs of design characteristics for support needs and must be able 
to defend the requirements they propose.  Figure 4-4 provides specific examples of support 
















Figure 4-4.  Supportability Design Factors (F-16 Aircraft) 
 
 
Ultimately, the supportability needs must be translated into specific 
requirements.  A related document states that defining these "essential qualitative and 
quantitative readiness and logistics supportability requirements in operational concepts 
and requirements documents is the most effective way for users to influence the design of 
their systems (Department of Air Force, Instruction 10-602, 1994)."  Figure 4-5 is a 
representative list of terms which can be use to define supportability requirements. 
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Figure 4-5  Terms for Defining Supportability Requirements 
c. Critical Processes  
The handbook emphasized the importance of effectively managing critical 
processes.  A related Air Force guide for Critical Process Assessment Tools (CPATs) 
offers some keen insight into the design of the support system.  The basic principal is that 
“effective logistics is all in the design.”  The “logistics engineer must be an advocate for 
their point of view as well as a respected participant and full member of the system 
engineering team.”  Credibility is a critical factor whereby “logistics parochialism is 
inversely proportionate to logistics believability.”  The “logistics system and money are 
inextricably tied” to one another, mandating that an adequate up-front monetary 
Terms for Defining Supportability Requirements 
1. Administrative and Logistics 
Delay Time 
25. Integrated Combat 
Turnaround Time 
49. Restoral Time  
2. Alert Reliability 26. Integrated Diagnostics & 
Effectiveness 
50. Scheduled Maintenance 
3. Availability 27. Life Unit 51. Service Life 
4. Built-in Test Effectiveness 28. Logistics Reliability 52. Software Error 
5. Captive Carry Reliability 29. Maintainability 53. Software Failure 
6. Combat Capability 30. Maintenance Action 54. Software Maintainability 
7. Corrective Maintenance 31. Maintenance Event 55. Software Maturity 
8. Critical Failure 32. Maintenance Event Time 56. Software Reliability 
9. Defect 33. Maintenance Man-Hours Per 
Life Unit 
57. Stock Availability 
10. Degradation 34. Maintenance Turnaround 
Time 
58. Storage Life 
11. Dependability 35. Manpower Spaces Per 
System 
59. Subsystem Break Rate 
12. Deployability 36. Mean Downtime 60. Subsystem Utilization Rate 
13. Dormant Storage Reliability 37. Mission Capability 61. Support Structure 
Vulnerability 
14. Downing Event 38. Mission Effectiveness 62. Sustainability 
15. Downtime 39. Mission Reliability 63. System Deployability 
16. Environmental Stress 
Screening 
40. Mobility 64. Time Between Maintenance 
Events 
17. Failure 41. Operational Availability 65. Time Between Removals 
18. False Alarm 42. Operational Effectiveness 66. Time to Assemble & Prep 
for Delivery 
19. Fault 43. Operational Suitability 67. Time to Restore Function 
20. Fault Isolation 44. Preventive Maintenance 68. Time to Troubleshoot 
21. Fix Rate 45. Readiness 69. Unconfirmed Fault 
Indications 
22. Incoming Reliability 46. Reliability 70. Unscheduled Maintenance  
23. Inflight Engine Shutdown   
Rate 
47. Reliability Growth 71. Utilization Rate 
24. Inherent Availability 48. Repair Time 72. Vertical Testability 
 22
investment provides assurance of the optimum logistics support structure which is 
resolved through a comprehensive Life-cycle Cost (LCC) analysis (CPAT for ILS, 1998).  
The CPAT further defines “Logistics as a System Engineering Discipline” consisting of 
the following three fundamental disciplines:  
• System Engineering - consisting of the processes of the supportability 
concept, analysis, architecture, and technical parameters.  In particular, the 
key system performance parameters are identified as: 
1) Availability - the degree to which a system is in an operable state and 
ready to start its mission. 
2) Dependability - the degree to which a system is operable and capable 
of performing its mission (given system Availability as the start of its 
mission). 
3) Downtime – that element of active operational time when the system is 
not in a condition to perform its required function (mission). 
4) Single Point Failure - the failure of an item which would result in a 
system failure, and is not compensated for by redundancy or alternative 
operational procedures. 
• Design Engineering - consisting of the reliability and maintainability 
foundation, human factors engineering and safety considerations, 
configuration management, and concurrent engineering. 
• Logistics Integration - consisting of the external interfaces, the ILS 
internal interfaces, and the Government-furnished equipment and materiel. 
d. Maintenance Planning 
A consistent theme throughout a review of data on O&S Costs reduction is 
the importance of maintenance planning.  Maintenance planning is defined as “the 
process conducted to evolve and establish maintenance concepts and requirements for the 
lifetime of a materiel system (DSMC ILS Guide, 1999).  In an Air Force guide on the 
subject, maintenance planning is characterized as “probably the most significant factor 
influencing a program’s support strategy and life-cycle support costs.”  Maintenance 
planning is further identified as “critical to subsequent system and logistics 
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development,” as the “key to all other logistic element planning and requirements,” and is 
the “backbone of the overall support strategy” (CPAT for Maintainability, 1998).    
1) Objectives  
In general, the objectives of maintenance planning are to translate 
the maintenance approach stated in requirements documents into maintenance task 
requirements, to define the actions and support resources needed to maintain items at all 
levels of maintenance, and to define specific criteria for repair times, locations, 
frequencies, diagnostics, etc. at each level of maintenance.  In short, the data indicates 
that maintenance planning is the logistics engineer’s primary tool for designing and 
executing the support system.  For example, Figure 4-6 is a listing of specific 
maintenance design requirements for the Navy’s F-18 aircraft, which have an impact to 
TOC. 








Figure 4-6.  Maintenance Design Requirements (F-18 Aircraft) 
2) Process 
The maintenance planning process is typically described based on     
the particular phase in the system life-cycle.  From a review of the literature, the three 
foundational steps of the maintenance planning process are generally defined as follows 
(CPAT for ILS, 1998): 
    1st:  Identify the repairable items which are critical from a system 
engineering perspective. 
    2nd:  Determine the Corrective and Preventive Maintenance requirements for 
the most critical failures and to determine the most affordable level of 
maintenance repair tasks for the identified failure modes. 
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   3rd:  Perform maintainability engineering task analyses to document the 
needed resources (tools, parts, training, documentation, etc.) to perform the 
necessary maintenance. 
 
The data also indicates that the overall critical process of maintainability is 
to successfully transition the operational document requirements to specific 
maintainability criteria in the system design.  Specifically, the critical processes are to 
establish the inter-related supportability performance, operational availability, and system 
affordability requirements that must be expressed in measurable and testable 
maintainability terms (CPAT for Maintainability, 1998).  Finally, the importance of a 
Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) program is repeatedly emphasized to 
selectively apply scheduled maintenance in order that critical failures can to anticipated, 
minimized, and/or prevented (Department of Air Force Instruction 21-103, 1994). 
3) Impact of Acquisition Reform  
Acquisition reform has significantly impacted the conduct of 
maintenance planning.  The transition to performance specifications spelled the “demise 
of Mil-Standard 1388 better known as Logistics Support Analysis (LSA)” which was the 
mature and battle-hardened process for LSA and detailed maintenance planning.  This 
military standard has been replaced by a variety of similar processes such as Flexible 
Sustainment whereby performance-based specifications are used to link maintainability 
requirements to reliability and to understand how changes in maintenance plans 
“triggers” changes in asset management (CPAT for Maintainability, 1998). 
5. O&S Cost Reduction Data 
The airwaves of the DOD acquisition community are currently filled with 
information on O&S Cost Reduction and Reduction of Total Ownership Cost.  The 
following information provides a synopsis of several key activities of O&S Costs 
reduction within DOD and the various Services. 
a. Senior Leadership Vision 
In a May 1999 memorandum (Pallas, 2000), the Defense Department 
defined the following “three large potential savings areas” for Reduction of the Total 
Cost of Ownership (R-TOC) in the 30 DOD pilot programs as:  
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1) Reduce demand from weapon systems via reliability and 
maintainability improvements. 
2) Reduced supply chain response times leading to reduce 
spares, a reduced system support footprint, and reduced depot 
needs. 
3) Competitive sourcing of product support leading to 
streamlining and overhead reduction. 
 
b. R-TOC Implementation Guides 
Each of the Services has implementation guides on R-TOC.  Typically, 
each guide follows a general pattern of first defining the cost drivers and targets of 
opportunity and then implementing a specific cost reduction plan (Website, Affordable 
Readiness).  The overwhelming majority of data dealing with O&S Costs reduction 
relates to fielded systems (rather than how to reduce O&S costs for systems in 
development).  Interestly, the R-TOC guides seem to suggest that readiness and R-TOC 
are mutually exclusive.  A relevant concern should be that with declining expenditures, 
(in the quest for cost reduction), there may be a direct impact to system readiness levels.  
Each Service defines the major areas of opportunity for its systems.  For example, the 
U.S. Navy Air Systems Command identified the following principal areas of cost (TOC 
Implementation Guidebook, 1998): 
1) Inventory:  Aircraft, engines, spares, support equipment, and 
training devices 
2) Manpower:  Military, civil service, and contractor 
3) Technical Data:  Publications, engineering drawings, 
software 
4) Infrastructure:  Buildings, facilities, test & evaluation 
equipment, production tooling  
The total breakdown of O&S Costs for a particular service or commodity 
provides an excellent framework for evaluating what cost drivers contributed to these 
costs.  The breakdown of the principal O&S Costs drivers for the U.S. Navy’s Air 




Figure 4-7.  Principal O&S Costs Drivers for NAVAIR 
Each service is collecting the early lessons learned in their cost reduction 
efforts.  For example, the principal lessons learned by the Army include the importance 
of reliability and maintainability improvements (with emphasis on built-in capabilities), 
the good return-on-investment decisions by reductions in depot maintenance and supply 
chain cycle times, and the economical benefits of competitive outsourcing of product 
support (Website, Department of Army R-TOC).  
c. Progress To Date 
The progress on O&S Costs reduction remains mixed.  R-TOC reports 
from the Services’ 30 pilot programs indicate substantial progress in many areas.  
Inhibitors such as lack of incentives, investment funding, and funding control remain a 
problem.  Approximately half of the 30 systems are “on-track” to meet their goals with 
the remainder either “falling short” or “unavailable” (Website, DOD R-TOC).  
Additionally, two General Accounting Office (GAO) reports on the Army (Report, GAO 
#00-197, 2000) and Air Force (Report, GAO #00-165, 2000) indicate that efforts are 
falling short due to lack of priority, insufficient mechanisms, improperly assigned 
responsibility, and minimal incentives.   
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C.   GENERAL INITIATIVES TO REDUCE O&S COSTS   
 The research data identifies the following initiatives that are underway within 
DOD or a particular service to directly or indirectly reduce O&S Costs.  The initiatives 
are categorized by whether they are a design or plan-related activity.   
1. Design-Related Initiatives 
a. Reducing Logistics Demand through Design 
This grassroots effort is simply to reduce the demand for logistics through 
more reliable, available, and maintainable designs.  Ultra-reliability, one of the six topical 
pillars of the Army After Next (AAN), seeks to reduce this demand by achieving inherent 
reliabilities of greater that 95%, implementing horizontal technology integration with 
common architecture across families of systems, and using smart software to simplify the 
basic design of systems  (Renee, 2000).  Technological approaches to design-out demand 
include nano-technology (building items one molecule at a time for better reliability) and 
mechanical extensions of microelectronics.  Also known as the "second silicon 
revolution," microelectronics has unique opportunities for reducing logistics demands for 
ammunition, petroleum, and food (Shipbaugh, 2000).  Other initiatives include biometrics 
(developing novel synthetic materials and sensors), mobile wireless communication, 
intelligent systems, smart structures, compact power sources, and micro-miniature 
multifunctional sensors (Pollard, 1999).  As a specific example, Future Combat Vehicles 
(FCV) in the Army have numerous opportunities for designing-out demand through on-
board, real-time, self-reporting prognostics, advanced nonhydrocarbon-based fuels and 
propulsion systems, and reduced corrosion by curving metal surfaces at joints (Reed, 
2001). 
b. Open Systems Architecture 
Open systems architecture is an approach whereby the system’s hardware 
and software is designed to easily accept future technical upgrades and modifications 
throughout the system life-cycle.  The critical elements of design include the system 
interfaces (connectors, buses, operating systems), system capacities (memory, 
throughput, power), and formats (software, video) (NPS Brief, 2001).  The key activities 
 28
in applying open systems architecture to reduce life-cycle supportability costs consist of 
the following (Hanratty, 1999): 
1) Focus on the key interfaces that are most likely to change, 
have increased requirements, have increased replacement 
frequencies, or have high costs. 
2) Use open standards for these interfaces that are supported 
by the broader community 
3) Use a modular design approach with well-defined 
interfaces between modules 
4) Identify the lowest level Government control and 
anticipate how this may change over time 
5) Verify all performance requirements and re-evaluate their 
stringency 
6) Implement consistent conformance management practices 
 
c. Modular Design 
Modularity is a design approach whereby hardware is structured in 
standardized dimensions for easy assembly/disassembly.  This fundamental design 
feature allows great flexibility and efficiency during repair, modification, and 
improvements.  Modularity improves the ability to adapt to change and provides systems 
the ability for continuous, uninterrupted support (Elsmo, 1999). 
d. Modernization through Spares/Technology Insertion 
This practical initiative seeks to utilize the continual purchase of spare 
parts to modernize the system.  Replacement spares have the latest-and-greatest 
capabilities incorporated into the item which improves reliability and maintainability and 
thus reduces O&S Costs over the long term (Gagnon, 1999). 
e. Affordable Readiness 
Affordable readiness is a basic tool aimed at making every programmatic 
decision within the context of affordability, particularly in terms of supportability costs.  
The types of implemented initiatives include equipment redesign, reliability 
improvements through maintenance changes, obsolescence avoidance, engine-related 
redesign activities, test program set and software development changes, and maintenance 
process changes.  The implementation of these initiatives is dependant upon the expected 
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return-on-investment in terms of improved readiness (Website, Department of Navy, 
Affordable Readiness, 2001). 
f. Recapitalization 
This approach is the systematic upgrade of currently fielded systems to 
attempt to turn the “age-clock” back to zero.  Recapitalization uses maintenance and 
modification techniques to extend service life, reduce O&S Costs, improve reliability and 
maintainability, and enhance capability.  The Army has an extensive recapitalization 
program for most of its major weapon systems using Research, Development, Test, and 
Evaluation (RDT&E) and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funding (Website, 
Department of Army, R-TOC, Recap). 
g. Retail Logistics Revolution 
While the wholesale logistics systems tends to receive the majority of 
attention, numerous activities are underway within the retail structure to achieve 
substantial O&S Costs reductions.  The battlefield is being redesigned to modular units, 
centralized logistics operators, new theater support commands to maximize throughput, 
minimized handling, and increased velocity of operations.  Automation is driving this re-
design activity.  New technologies such as the Palletized Loading Systems (PLS), 
Container Roll In-Out Platforms (CROP), and Movement Tracking Systems (MTS) will 
enable substantially more effective distribution systems.  Information-age technology for 
combat support and combat service support systems will greatly improve situational 
awareness of logistics needs to promote a seamless logistics pipeline throughout the retail 
structure (Witt, 1999). 
2. Plan-Related Initiatives 
a. Single Process Initiative 
This DOD-wide initiative with industry “facilitates the elimination of the 
distinction between traditional defense and commercial suppliers (Gansler, 1998)".  This 
initiative ultimately becomes the mechanism by which DOD expedites the transition of 
existing Government contracts to common best processes.  The principal goal of the 
single process initiative is to convert DOD to commercial process to improve 
effectiveness and reduce costs.  For example, changes to contracts negotiated by the 
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Defense Contract Management Command (now Agency) (DCMC) within a single year 
have resulted in direct savings of $30 million and a cost avoidance of $444 million 
(Gansler, 1998). 
b. Lean/Focused Logistics 
As the name implies, lean logistics is merely a system of innovations to 
revolutionize the culture of how supportability is performed.  Lean logistics is defined as 
“an interrelated series of logistics initiatives that promote combat capability, enhance our 
war-fighting sustainability, shrink the logistics footprint, and reduce infrastructure 
(Cusick, 1999)."  Focused logistics initiatives include accelerated movement of assets 
through transportation and repair cycles, downsizing logistics resources, implementing 
computer-based training, developing more reliable simulations and modeling, and 
utilization of state-of-the-art decision-making tools.  The actual lean logistics innovations 
which have produced significant savings include two-level maintenance concepts, high-
velocity transportation, door-to-door transportation, repair and return packaging, just-in-
time practices, mail-like matter movement, smaller tailor stocks, and electronic data 
exchange (Morrill, 1995).  Finally, the total Logistics Footprint of the support structure 
can be reduced through robotics, unmanned vehicles, intelligent agents, smart/brilliant 
munitions, and advanced information technology (Houck, 1999). 
c. Total Asset Visibility 
Total Asset Visibility (TAV) is “an automated capability that will 
dramatically improve the ability of soldiers, logisticians, and managers obtain 
information on the location, quantity, condition, and movement of assets through the 
logistics pipeline.”  Ultimately, massive cost savings are anticipated by reducing the 
quantity of parts needed to fill a more streamlined logistics tail (Butler, 1999). 
d. Prime Vendor Support (PVS) and Total System Performance                   
Responsibility (TSPR) 
Prime Vendor Support (PVS), also known as Fleet Management, is a 
partnership of Government with industry by having "the prime contractor assume 
responsibility for total performance of a weapon system and its modernization by 
integrating modernized parts (Gavora, 1999)."   This revolutionary concept capitalizes on 
contractor best practices and innovation to achieve the cost reductions.  The PVS 
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initiatives have major challenges due to integration of contractors with the wholesale 
logistics system, loss of organic capabilities, contractors on the battlefield, validation of 
savings, and a variety of other factors.  Closely related to PVS is Total System 
Performance Responsibility (TSPR) whereby a contractor is responsible for system 
modifications, integration, and sustainment tasks for a weapon system while the 
Government remains responsible for over-all execution.  Significant savings have been 
achieved in reducing the size of the Air Force program offices, reducing Navy aircraft 
total O&S Costs, and savings from partnerships between the prime contractor and 
Government depots (Luddeke, 2000). 
e. Commercial Item Acquisition 
The expanded use of commercially available items provides opportunities 
for reduced cycle times, faster insertion of new technology, lower life-cycle costs, greater 
reliability and availability, and support from a robust industrial base.  The use of these 
commercial items is now the "preferred approach" for meeting operational requirements 
(DOD Directive 5000.1, 2000).  The use of commercial items clearly requires renewed 
emphasis on traditional business and engineering practices and requires the thorough 
understanding of the mandates of the commercial marketplace.  However, the data 
indicates that the benefits far outweigh the obstacles.  The use of commercial items 
continues to demonstrate remarkable improvements in the cost and performance of 
supportability (Report, OSD, 2000).   
f. Operationalizing Acquisition 
Operationalizing acquisition is a fairly radical change of focus in military 
acquisition.  Since the primary objective of the military is mission, not profit, commercial 
business practices are not working very well in many areas of the military environment.  
Many believe the time is right for acquisition to return to its military roots by converting  
program directors and managers into program commanders and eliminating matrixed 





g. Logistics Modernization 
Springing from DOD's commitment to innovative approaches to 
performing business, the Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program (WLMP) will 
overhaul the Army's Logistics System by replacing the existing antiquated logistics and 
depot maintenance system.  The digitized system is intended to successfully rival any 
commercial system.  The contract for this logistics automation will be awarded to one 
contractor, with the possibility of extending the contract and expanding its scope (Ferlise, 
2000).  The WLMP also involves converting existing Government functions to the 
private sector.  Specifically, the WLMP contract requires  the winning offeror to provide 
reengineering and modernization Services for the Army’s current wholesale logistics 
system (Lea, 2000). 
h. Training & Reorganization 
The Department of Defense (DOD) has been cutting logistics funding for 
years and is now seeking to privatize logistics operations to pay for recapitalization.  As a 
result, the future of the current logistics workforce must be changed.  To support the 
deployment and sustainment of an armed force, DOD needs certain skills, including those 
necessary to define outsourcing and strategies and to measure results.  As a minimum 
DOD needs to expand the training of the logistics workforce to ensure that future 
logisticians have the skills needed to manage core logistics tasks in a changing 
environment, reorganize some logistics structures, and elevate logistics representation at 
the most senior Defense Department levels commensurate with its cost and impact 
(Jones, 1997). 
i. Industry Integrated Logistics System (I²LS) 
This approach combines elements of military and corporate strategies to 
allow DOD to take links out of the supply chain.  A good example of shortening the 
supply chain was done in the 1960’s by Sam Walton.  He realized that by cutting links 
out of the chain and allowing goods to “leapfrog” from the manufacturer directly to the 
stores, he would save both delivery time and product costs.  Today, modern civilian 
manufacturing and distribution systems have reduced delivery response times from weeks 
to just a few days by leap-frogging over traditional intermediary points.  Taking 
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advantage of these efficient systems will greatly improve component availability while 
reducing the inventory costs of existing Government wholesale operations (Boyd, 1998). 
D. WEAPON SYSTEM O&S COST REDUCTION   
1. Design-Related 
a. Army Systems   
1) AH-64 Apache Helicopter 
 The Army’s attack helicopter, the Apache, is currently in the early 
stages of a major upgrade from the original A-model aircraft to a D-model.  With this 
major upgrade, the depth and scope of changes are actually commensurate with a new 
production program.  Additionally, the program has a robust recapitalization program 
seeking to return the aging carry-over components to a zero-life/like-new condition.  
Consequently, a major emphasis of O&S Costs reduction is to incorporate design 
improvements concurrent with the production upgrades and recapitalization efforts 
(Website, DOD R-TOC).  As for O&S Costs drivers, an unusually high percentage of 
O&S Costs are consolidated in just a few items.  Figure 4-8 below indicates that 30% of 
the total aircraft costs are in a single item (target acquisition system) and 78% of the total 
aircraft costs are in the top five categories of items.   
Figure 4-8.  Top Apache Cost Drivers 
 
 
T o p  A p a c h e  C o s t  D r iv e r s
C o s t  D r iv e r s
1 . T A D S /P V N S  (3 0 % )
2 . R o t o r  ( 1 5 % )
3 . P r o p u ls io n  (1 2 % )
4 . D r iv e  ( 1 1 % )
5 . A v io n ic s  (1 0 % )
6 . H y d r a u l ic s  (6 % )
7 . E le c t r ic a l  (5 % )
8 . In s t r u m e n ts  ( 3 % )
9 . A i r f r a m e  ( 3 % )
1 0 . 3 0  M M  ( 2 % )
1 1 . F l ig h t  C o n tr o ls  (2 % )
1 2 . A P U  ( 1 % )
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The chief metric for evaluating the impact of these cost drivers is their 
relationship to the Per Flying Hour Cost of the aircraft.  Specific design-related issues  
with the target acquisition system (top cost driver) include a 25-year-old design, 
insufficient Built-in Test (BIT), a large number of Line Replaceable Units (26), a large 
number of overall parts (over 9000), extensive obsolescence issues, the over-all 
architecture and processing design of the system being “maxed-out”, and a high number 
of historical engineering changes (450).  Horizontal Technology Integration (HTI) 
initiatives have resulted in an approximately $260M cost avoidance (Nenninger, 2001).  
Reliability improvements are a key component of the O&S Cost reduction strategy but 
have encountered problems obtaining sufficient funding.  Finally, key maintenance focus 
areas include reducing the maintenance hours per flight hour, eliminating unscheduled 
maintenance, and substantially reducing scheduled maintenance (Bosse, 2001).  The key 
design-related lesson learned to date from the R-TOC program is a “clearly articulated set 
of requirements (Nenniger, 2001)." 
2) M-1 Abrams Tank 
The Army’s main battle tank has multiple configurations of tanks 
produced over a long period of time.  The principal design-related O&S Cost reduction 
activities are a major partnership program with industry to overhaul the entire fleet to 
extend the fleet life by approximately 30 years and the implementation of a technical 
support program to replace obsolete parts, enhance vehicle safety, and provide post-
deployment software support (Website, DOD R-TOC).  In particular, the partnership 
program between Anniston Army Depot and General Dynamics for the system overhaul 
program has reduced future O&S Costs by as much as 50% through reliability and 
maintainability opportunities (Matthews, 1999).  Specific reliability and maintainability 
activities include the rebuild of the gas turbine engine, replacement of the original 
Abrams engine, an contractor-depot innovative overhaul program to original factory 
standards, a redesign of key turret and hull LRUs, and the incorporation of an embedded 
diagnostics system (Website, DOD R-TOC).  Abrams has also instituted a comprehensive 
Modernization Through Spares (MTS) program, a Simplified Test Equipment program 
for an automated test system for vehicle diagnostics, a second-generation Forward 
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Looking InfraRed (FLIR) sighting system to replace the current system, and a series of 
other major item modification programs (Website, Abrams Project Office). 
3) Crusader Howitzer 
The Army’s developmental program to field a new self-propelled 
howitzer system has recently been restructured for consistency with the Objective Force 
and Army Vision.  This system, consisting of three main vehicles, is focusing on design 
activities to reduce O&S Costs as a flagship program under the Cost As an Independent 
Variable (CAIV) initiative.  Key design activities include open architecture, component 
commonality, embedded diagnostics/prognostics, system automation, and LRU 
modularity.  Maintainability initiatives include better packaging and cabling of electronic 
components, changing the level of replacement from large LRUs to circuit cards, 
increased parts commonality, and improved accessibility.  Reliability improvements 
focus on reducing the number of propellant and projectile carriers, changing the turret 
traverse concept, and reducing the number of road wheels and support rollers (Website, 
DOD R-TOC).  A key commonality initiative is the use of a slightly-different version of 
the same engine to be retrofitted to existing Abrams tanks.  Of the predicted total O&S 
Costs for the system, 77% of the costs are expected to be in military and maintenance 
personnel (See Figure 4-9 below).  The design activities are expected to reduce the over-
all personnel costs by 13% to 33%.  Spare and repair parts are expected to be 13% of the 
over-all O&S Costs of the system.  A single item, the LV-100 engine, is expected to 
account for 23% of the total parts cost of the system and only 14 items account for 86% 
of the predicted total parts cost for the system.  Crusader is using a variety of R-TOC 
tools, models, and techniques to make the correct design decisions (Mattingly, 2001).    
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Figure 4-9.  Crusader O & S Cost Drivers 
4) Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) 
The Army’s rocket and missile launcher is a fielded system with 
products in all phases of the life-cycle.  The design-related initiatives are focused on the 
top ten cost drivers.  The vehicle’s Electronics Unit is being modified by redesigning one 
of the circuit cards, by incorporating a new relay, and by applying additional vent-cooling 
value covers.  The Fire Control Unit is being modified by six specific Modifications 
Work Orders (MWOs) to improve reliability.  For the mechanical hardware, the 
transmission has two assemblies being replaced for improved reliability and 
maintainability.  Additionally, numerous MWOs are being applied to the engine, the ball 
screw actuator assembly, and the elevation transmission.  One catalyst for these design-
related initiatives is the goal of reducing military personnel O&S Costs.  As shown in 
Figure 4-10, the three top ownership cost drivers are all military pay categories which 
account for a whooping 74% of ownership cost!  Finally, the figure indicates that only 
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19% of total ownership costs are "manageable by the program office (MLRS Brief, 
2000)." 
 
Figure 4-10.  Top 10 Costs of Ownership Drivers (MLRS) 
b. Air Force Programs   
1) B-1 Bomber 
The Air Force's long-range strategic bomber has a limited 
inventory (93 planes) of fielded aircraft.  The B-1’s design-related O&S Costs reduction 
efforts center around two major subsystem upgrades (aircraft computer and defense 
systems) and a variety of reliability and maintainability improvements (Website, DOD R-
TOC).  The specific R&M initiatives include the elimination of a fuel tank guard 
requirement, the insertion of a long-life windshield, the upgrade of system & radar test 
benches, a new digital engine controller, digitized technical orders, and an electrical load 
upgrade.  Finally, the consolidation of LRU repair into one long-term contract will save 
over $2.2M annually (Miller, 2001). 
2) Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)  
The 33 aircraft in the Air Force’s AWACS inventory are modified 
Boeing 707 commercial aircraft to provide critical surveillance and command & control.  
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The focal area of design-related O&S Costs reduction efforts are the selective 
modification and replacement of subsystems  (Website, DOD R-TOC).  The low-density, 
but high-OPTEMPO systems have 51% of its total O&S Costs in mission personnel.  The 
three O&S Costs drivers targeted for cost reduction are depot-level reparables, 
Petroleum/Oil/Lubricants (POL), and overhaul/rework.  Two of these three categories are 
projected to have significant cost growth in future years as shown in Figure 4-11 below.  
Reliability and maintainability candidates are boost pumps, automatic test equipment, 
consoles, de-fueling panels, and wiring replacement.  Due to the limited density of 
aircraft, modifications and improvements have marginal return-on-investment savings 
(Robillard, 2001). 








































Figure 4-11.  Major O & S Cost Drivers (AWACS) 
3) F-16 Falcon Aircraft 
This multi-role fighter aircraft has been fielded since the late 1970s 
and has over 3,000 operational aircraft in over 20 nations.  The design-related O&S Costs 
reduction activities are focused on a wide variety of reliability and maintainability 
improvements to include lightweight wheels and brakes, a heads-up display electronic 
unit as a Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative (COSSI), a maintenance-
free battery, a falen modification to prohibit moisture intrusion, and an electronic 
lubricant for corrosion prevention.  Other R&M improvements include a new ring laser 
 39
gyro that doubled the previous mean-time-between-failure metric, a hydraulic filter 
replacement, which increased on-demand maintenance scheduling to every 600 flying 
hours, and a falcon-flex cable that greatly improved avionics maintainability (Website, 
DOD R-TOC).  The design improvements revolve around a systematic “block” 
modification strategy, which has involved over 60 major block modification programs 
over the past 25 years (Website, Military Analysis Network).  
4) C-17 Globemaster II Aircraft 
The Air Force's newest, most-flexible cargo aircraft’s design-
related O&S Cost reduction initiatives include a modern intermediate-level test station, a 
combustion exit temperature kit for the engine, and an optical quick access recorder 
upgrade (Website, DOD R-TOC).  The program had a major emphasis on reliability and 
maintainability during its design phase which resulted in substantial O&S savings in 
reduced manpower and spares requirements.  The validation of these R&M requirements 
was one of the programs three critical goals at its milestone review and was accomplished 
by a rigorous 12 aircraft “up-tempo” exercise for 30 consecutive days.  Figure 4-12 
below summarizes the reliability and maintainability achievements (Davis, 1997).  A 
General Accounting Office (GAO) report confirmed that the aircraft met or exceeded 10 
of the 11 requirements, but that the evaluation was less demanding than originally 
planned.  The one requirement, which was not met, was “built-in test parameters (Report, 
GAO  #96-127, 1996)."  One of the major lessons learned from the program for future 
acquisitions was the criticality of designing the system with the "flexibility to grow and 
adapt via an open system architecture (Kennedy, 1999)." 
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Figure 4-12.  Reliability & Maintainability Achievements (C-17 Aircraft) 
c. Navy & Marine Corps Programs 
1) CVN-68 Aircraft Carrier 
As the largest warships in the world, the nine nuclear carriers have 
a service life of 50 years and an annual unit operating cost of approximately $160M!  The 
ongoing design-related initiatives are focused on reliability and maintainability 
improvements and include improved composite materials, commercial air compressors, 
transient voltage suppressors, ventilation moisture separators, and improving materials to 
reduce maintenance costs.  R&M actions are typically performed as scheduled “block” 
modification activities (Website, DOD R-TOC).  Additional unique initiatives such as 
Engineering for Reduced Maintenance, Technology Back Fit, Cumbersome Work 
Practices Analysis, and Smart Carrier Initiatives, focus on reductions in military 
personnel accounts, particularly in maintenance costs and crew workload (Report, GAO 
to Senate, 2001). 
2) Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)  
The armored Marine Corps personnel carrier has been one of 
DOD’s most successful programs in reducing O&S Costs via innovative design activities 
in its developmental phase.  The system’s “virtual prototype” and “ simulation design 
approach” allowed numerous initiatives to be tested, refined, and proven to a high-degree 
of design maturity before expensive full-scale development was initiated (Website, 
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Department of Navy, Best Practices).  General design-related improvements were 
reliability and maintainability improvements in the engine's design, common 
ammunition, a "unique spray-cooling" chassis, and the mandate of a two-level 
maintenance concept (Website, DOD R-TOC).  Specifically, the program required the 
contractor to adhere to innovative design rules such as limiting on-board tools, requiring 
specific maintenance accessibility, controlling maintenance interfaces, designing LRU’s 
for replacement in uncontrolled environments, and quantifying operator/maintainer 
abilities to perform tasks to 90% accuracy one-month after initial training.  Other O&S 
improvements included embedded training, interactive electronic technical manuals, 
extensive built-in test, partitioning of LRUs based on function/interconnectivity/skills, 
and the use of commercial off-the-shelf hardware and other non-developmental items 
(Website, AAAV Program Office). 
3) LPD-17 Amphibious Transport Ship 
The Navy's new transport ship, currently in the development phase, 
will replace four existing classes of amphibious ships.  The first ship will be delivered in 
FY 03 and have a 40-year service life (Website, DOD R-TOC).  The system’s principal 
life-cycle O&S Costs drivers are manpower (39%) and maintenance (32%).  These two 
areas are being attacked through integrated product teams using a host of modeling and 
simulation tools (Association of Scientists and Engineers, 1998).  The approach to 
reducing these two cost-drivers covers a wide variety of activities, which include policy 
changes to achieve space and manpower efficiencies, the reduction in over-all 
maintenance workload, the implementation of new technologies to reduce the demand for 
maintenance, and ship departmental reorganizations (Final Systems Engineering Report, 
1997).  The program’s specific design-related O&S Costs reduction efforts are primarily 
reliability & maintainability initiatives such as an Advanced Enclosed Mast System with 
improved reliability, reduced sensor maintenance, an open architecture for future 
upgrades, improved coatings for corrosion control, improved food service, new 
emergency automatic lighting systems that incorporates better batteries, and the reduction 
of Government-furnished equipment (Website, DOD R-TOC).  To date, the initiatives 
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have collectively achieved an estimated $4.3 billion life cycle cost avoidance out of a 
$5.2 billion goal (Report, GAO to Senate, 2001). 
4) H-60 Helicopters 
The H-60 program is a consolidation of three in-service helicopter 
programs with a major emphasis on remanufacturing, service-life extensions, and new 
production to create a total fleet of 500 helicopters (Website, DOD R-TOC).  The 
program’s design-related O&S Costs reduction efforts are focused on reliability, 
maintainability, availability, and safety.  Specific efforts include an increase in dynamic 
component life limits, the development of an Integrated Individual Aircraft Fatigue 
Tracking System, improved batteries, additional test sets, a common cockpit, a value-
engineered mission computer, and a Health Usage Monitoring Systems (Husaim, 2001).  
Other O&S initiatives are the reduction in the number of configurations to support, 
utilizing remanufacture to increase reliability and maintainability characteristics of 
LRU’s, and utilizing recapitalization programs to decrease the demand for scheduled 
maintenance (Report, GAO to Senate, 2001).    
2. Plan-Related   
a. Army Systems  
1) AH-64 Apache Helicopter 
This program has pursued a Prime Vendor Support (PVS) 
approach whereby the prime contractor (Boeing) would “assume total responsibility 
(nose-to-tail) for the wholesale support of the Apache helicopter, which includes 
availability guarantees, modernizes the aircraft through spare parts, and partners with the 
Army depots.”  However, PVS for Apache was terminated in November 2000 
(Nenninger, 2001) due to unresolved Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF) issues.  With 
the fielding of the D-Model aircraft, the maintenance concept is being changed from the 
current three to two levels of maintenance, more LRUs are being replaced at the unit 
level, training devices are being substantially improved, integrated electronic technical 
manuals are being fielded, and spares management is being improved via single asset 
managers (Website, DOD R-TOC). 
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2) M-1 Abrams Tank  
The Abrams program is implementing a Performance-Based Field 
Logistic Support program consisting of a Government/industry partnership to provide 
configuration-unique support via repair, upgrade, and storage of spares and components.  
The partnership arrangement provides for a reduced surcharge and a streamlined order-
delivery management system.  Abrams is expanding the use of prime contractor support 
for depot-level repair of unique parts.  The program has been selected as one of four pilot 
programs to experiment with establishing formal performance agreements with the 
warfighter based on availability and readiness needs, the use of contracts with organic 
suppliers for output and availability, and the use of a program-specific working capital 
fund to pool funding sources in order to provide a robust financial base for the project 
manager (Website, DOD R-TOC). 
3) Crusader Howitzer 
The program's plan-related activities are to develop a life-cycle 
support system that integrates Government and industry sources for sustainment products 
and Services, that capitalizes on commercial best practices and technology advances, and 
integrates all elements of logistics support to provide optimal, cost-effective sustainment 
options  (Website, DOD R-TOC)."  A maintenance concept is planned that requires an 
open architecture for modernization through spares activities and other modular 
improvements (Mattingly, 2001). 
4) Multiple Launch Rocket System 
This program has developed a teaming approach with all 
“stakeholders” in ownership cost reduction to include the combat developer, Field 
Artillery schoolhouse, the Service materiel command, and all of the major contractors 
and vendors.  In addition to the normal O&S Costs reduction efforts of system 
improvements, an Integrated Product Team (IPT), chaired by the PM, is comprehensively 
addressing all areas in which O&S Costs may be reduced to include organizational 
changes, a team business approach between the prime contractor and project office, 
completely overhauling the sustainment process through which MLRS is sustained, and 
contracting-out logistics support and Services.  Since the system’s O&S Costs are 
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predominately in military pay accounts, the system is considering major structural 
changes to business practices.  These changes include workarounds with the Army 
Working Capital Fund (AWCF), control of O&S funding to include reprogramming 
authority, and relief from public laws dealing with the 50-50 contractor vs. organic core 
workload and waivers for A-76 privatization initiatives (MLRS Brief, 2000). 
b. Air Force Systems   
1) B-1 Bomber 
The fielded system is reducing the total fleet by approximately 
one-third and consolidating the aircraft at two bases to reduce the ownership costs.  The 
program is digitizing technical/maintenance procedures to more efficiently perform 
maintenance and make changes (Miller, 2001).  Service-level agreements with organic 
supply managers have been established to improve logistics response times.  Maintenance 
task intervals for some pieces of hardware are being extended.  Lifetime contractor repair 
arrangements are being re-negotiated to consolidate the repair of sets of Line Replaceable 
Units (LRUs) (Website, DOD R-TOC). 
2) AWACS Aircraft 
The program is using block upgrades, managed and implemented 
by the prime contractor, to expand the user-contractor partnership.  AWACS is increasing 
contractor weapon system responsibility via a planned single, overarching system support 
contract (Website, DOD R-TOC).  The program office is considering a Program Depot 
Maintenance (PDM) partnering agreement, actively seeking more subcontractor 
involvement, and evaluating the allocation of maintenance tasks between depot and field 
levels.  Finally, the program is wrestling with the dilemma of contracting for support 
when most of its prime mission equipment is “militarized” with very little commercial-
off-the-shelf hardware (Robillard, 2001). 
3) F-16 Falcon Aircraft 
This program in pursuing a Combined Life-Time Support Program 
with industry to partner for product support.  The production and spares contracts have 
incentives for contractors and vendors to build more reliable parts.  Technical and 
maintenance procedures are being digitized for more efficient use.  Support equipment is 
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being made more common to accommodate standardization needs, diminishing 
manufacturing sources, and obsolescence.  Process improvements are being implemented 
to improve workload disbursement, parts availability, and maintenance scheduling.  
Finally, the program is “examining the potential of Reliability Centered Maintenance 
(Website, DOD R-TOC)." 
4) C-17 Globemaster II Aircraft 
The C-17 program is implementing a total weapon system 
readiness responsibility arrangement with the prime contractor.  A single-point manager 
is responsible for integrating all spare parts issues, including non-inventory-control-point 
parts, with other Government agencies.  C-17 has procured a commercial data system for 
total asset visibility.  The program office is pursing a Flexible Sustainment Strategy 
contract on a trial basis.  This performance-based contract measures key system-level 
metrics as future evaluation criteria when deciding on whether permanent depot-level 
support will be organic or contract (Website, DOD R-TOC).  Finally, a Government 
report asserts that the Air Force paid significantly higher prices for spare parts when the 
prime contractor decided to produce the parts in-house rather than purchase the parts 
from outside vendors (Report, GAO #96-48). 
c. Navy & Marine Corps Programs   
1) CVN-68 Aircraft Carrier 
The Navy's plans for reducing O&S Costs on the carriers are 
activities, which reduce response times, require less spares, and have a reduced logistics 
footprint.  The possibility of competitive sourcing is identified as a “to be determined 
initiative (Website, DOD R-TOC)." 
2) AAAV Vehicle 
As a developmental system, AAAV is conducting a variety of 
supportability assessments to determine the specific supportability strategy to include the 
sources of supply and contractor logistics support (Website, DOD R-TOC).  Training and 
training support is considered the program's "most futuristic logistics initiative” which 
consists of extensive embedded training, a Distributive Interactive Simulation (DIS) 
environment that allows the Marines to participate in integrated mission rehearsals with 
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air and ship support, and an integrating Interactive Courseware System (ICS).  
Additionally, the training program provides gunnery, navigation, and driver training at 
the units and with deployed forces.  To foster real change, the project office employed 
"user juries” during the developmental program to advise and accept/reject ideas 
(Website, AAAV Program Office).  As one of the most unique initiatives in current 
acquisition practices, the program collocated the program office with the prime contractor 
and major subcontractors to maximize management effectiveness and efficiency and 
believes that “collocation has been a key to their success (Website, Department of Navy, 
Best Practices)."  The system utilizes a significant degree of commercial-off-the-shelf 
hardware and non-developmental items (Website, PM AAAV, 2001). 
3) LPD-17 Amphibious Transport Ship 
The developmental program is pursuing a Full Service Contracting 
(FSC) strategy whereby a single team is responsible for the complete design, 
construction, and critical life-cycle support functions for the entire ship class over its 
operational life.  The strategy includes a radical tactic of reducing (and possibly 
eliminating) Government-Furnished Equipment (Holser, 2001).  A Best Value Team has 
been established and is using a formalized tool to objectively determine the detail support 
strategy as an Integrated Product and Process Development (Association of Scientists and 
Engineers, 1998).  To support this life-cycle support goal, General Dynamics has 
enhanced its Bath Iron Works shipyard to offer fleet Services, integrated logistics support 
(all elements), post-deployment engineering, configuration management, operational 
cycle management, and other O&S functions in order to provide a complete post-
production support capability for ships (Website, General Dynamics).   
4) H-60 Helicopter 
The helicopter program is pursuing a variety of initiatives and 
plans to reduce O&S Costs.  An integrated maintenance concept is being implemented to 
consolidate the various maintenance concepts of the three similar aircraft models and 
configurations into one maintenance concept.  Direct-vendor delivery contracts are being 
established and parts tracking systems are being implemented to improve logistics 
response times (Website, DOD R-TOC).  Contractor long-term logistics contracts are 
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being awarded to execute performance-based requirements.  A pilot program of allowing 
the project office to re-invest 70% of achieved O&S savings into additional 
improvements is also being pursued (Husaim, 2001). 
E.   CHIEF LOGISTICIAN’S ROLE   
 The typical chief Logistician in a developmental program office faces formidable 
challenges in reducing O&S Costs.  As indicated in the previous data, this person has 
major policy obstacles to address, a wide variety of general logistics initiatives to 
accommodate, and a unique set of issues within his or her specific weapon system that 
must be resolved.  Given this environment, the following data discusses three basic roles 
that the Chief Logistician must play. 
1. Cultural Role  
The logistician continues to suffer from cultural impediments within the general 
acquisition community.  Program offices “strive to spend less on logistics.  Engineers are 
cranking out changes faster than the logistics systems can install or support them where 
the Program Manager can’t pay for them (Eaton, 2000)."  Technical performance and 
cost goals and activities dwarf those of logistics.  The logistician's chief concern, the cost 
of the logistics tail once the item has been fielded, is a minor concern to the design 
engineer and is "dutifully reported as a result of design," not a criteria of design 
(McIlvaine, 2000).  Logisticians often appear to be outside the acquisition world while 
those on the inside are "disrupting logistics at worst and sub-optimizing life-cycle support 
at best (Eaton, 2000)."  Many times, the measure of the logistician's worth is dealing with 
shortsighted design decisions and keeping systems in the field no matter how good or bad  
(McIlvaine, 2000).   
2. Program Role  
The general perspective on the importance of logistics as a critical factor in 
determining the program’s success continues to lag in importance.  In a recent survey 
concerning “program success indicators,” Project Managers ranked “meeting logistics 
supportability objectives” as least important of 5 major success indicators (Delano, 
1998).  The program office logistics/support office typically has smaller numbers of 
people, at a lower grade structure, with proportionally less funding, and at a physical 
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location removed from the mainstream of the project office.  From a simple listing on the 
organizational chart to the ranking of divisional inputs into key programmatic decisions, 
the logistician seems to consistently be placed last in the proverbial program office 
pecking order.  Regardless of these pitfalls, the critical success factors for a typical 
Governmental program seem to directly relate to the same roles that the logisticians 
needs to fulfill in the typical program office.  A recent study indicated that the top five 
critical success factors for a project office were, in order, “continuous meaningful 
visibility using measures, stable and adequate funding, leadership, clearly defined and 
stable requirements, and a technically-competent program office staff (Dobbins, 1998)." 
3. Occupational Role 
Generally, logisticians are developed from the two general career sources: 
maintenance and supply support.  Each of these two career fields has a distinctly different 
career path.  Maintenance, typically a GS-1670 Equipment Specialist career field, focuses 
on the technical aspects of maintainability engineering, maintenance planning, new 
equipment training, and maintenance publication development.  Currently, supply 
support, typically a GS-2010 Inventory Management career field, focuses on the 
inventory management of items to include requirements determination, major & 
secondary item management, procurement, and depot workloading.  While several other 
career fields are involved in general logistics management, these two fields represent the 
backbone of the historical occupational development of personnel staffing acquisition 
logistics positions in program offices.  The typical logistician working in the advanced 
areas of acquisition logistics are in the General Schedule (GS) Classification 346: 
Logistics Management Specialist.  Since the GS-346 field is in the administrative section 
of occupational classifications, some view this classification as a “serious disconnect” by 
not making a logistician an "occupational professional" (Eaton, 2000).  On a positive 
note, the person involved in acquisition logistics has a defined career path within the 
acquisition workforce.  The highest level of certification requires four years of 
acquisition experience (with four additional years desired), a desired master’s degree in a 
technical/scientific/managerial field, and a required combination of intermediate and 
advanced training courses (DOD Directive 5000.52-M, 1995).  As a result of this 
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directive, most senior logisticians matrixed to the PM's office are members of the Army 
Acquisition Corps (AAC) and are certified at the highest level (Level III).  Logisticians 
can earn a Certified Professional Logistician (CPL) designation through the International 
Society of Logistics Engineers (SOLE) by passing an extensive examination in the 
general areas of “systems management, system design and development, acquisition and 
production support, and distribution and customer support."  Currently, fewer than 2,500 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The following analysis surveys the entire landscape of data from the previous 
chapter to identify and discuss a distinct and insightful set of observations concerning the 
key roles and strategic imperatives of Chief Logisticians in reducing O&S Costs in 
developmental programs.  These key roles are organized into analytical sections that 
directly relate to the secondary research questions.  These analyses do not repeat the 
obvious "textbook-type" revelations of the sources of O&S Costs growth.  The basics of 
O&S Costs reduction are fairly well documented.  Rather, this analysis seeks to capture 
common trends and patterns that reveal the real keys to understanding how excessive 
O&S Costs are actually reduced and prevented during developmental programs.  
B. STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES 
1. Criticality of Timing  
The decision to not be involved at the “right time” in the system acquisition 
process may the single greatest mistake in reducing O&S Costs.  The life-cycle cost 
commitment model (Figure 4-1) is the central revelation in this “timing” issue.  Although 
universally accepted as a factual model, the model’s implications have essentially been 
disregarded over the previous decades (assuming the acquisition community was 
genuinely interested in O&S Costs reduction).  The model indicates that by Milestone III 
(now Milestone C), entry into full-scale production, essentially 95% of the system’s “life-
cycle costs are committed” although only about “10% of the life-cycle cost are actually 
expended.”  The basic point, as related to this Thesis, is that previous decisions have 
collectively determined future costs, regardless of what is being done in the present.  
Given that most life-cycle costs are in the O&S area and that these O&S Costs occur after 
Milestone III, then its logical to conclude that O&S Costs are “already pre-determined” 
prior to their actual occurrence.  I’ll refer to this revelation as the “Law of Pre-
destination of O&S” which is fully explained in succeeding paragraphs. 
2. Law of Predestination of O&S Costs  
The term “pre-destination” is a powerful term with profound consequences.  What 
the term implies is that you can do little, or nothing, to change the course of events once a 
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key decision or collection of decisions are made.  The term is often used in explain the 
Calvinist view of theology in which decisions made in the past determine the future 
regardless of what we do in the present.  The life-cycle model’s implications and the crux 
of the research that I’ve conducted indicate that the pre-destination is directly application 
to the strategic reduction of O&S Costs.  Once key decisions are made early in the life of 
the program, the logistician can do very little to actually substantially change the course 
of future O&S Costs.  This is supported by the discovery that essentially two-thirds of all 
O&S Costs initiatives identified in the research of fielded systems are actually just 
corrective actions of "bad" decisions made early in development.  While this timing issue 
will be explored further in future analysis, three general points need to made about the 
criticality of timing in order to avoid the inevitable consequences of the pre-destination. 
a. Any time… after the Beginning…is Too Late  
Pre-destination occurs at an exponential rate during the conception of the 
program.  According to the model, approximately 70% of life-cycle cost is pre-
determined by Milestone I (initiation of the demonstration/validation phase).  Most of the 
70% occurs in the earliest stage of the period between Milestone Zero and One.  
Consequently, the logistician’s principal ability to really impact O&S Costs are a direct 
function of decisions made long before the system even enters the 
demonstration/validation phase.  The emphasis is on “before” development; not “during” 
development.  Much of the literature today argues for the logistician to be an active 
partner with the concurrent engineering team as the principal methodology for insuring 
future O&S Costs are minimized.  The data indicates that even this "developmental 
involvement" is too late.  The largest percentage of O&S Costs are determined during the 
conceptual phase when requirements and specifications are being defined and not 
when logistics considerations are being designed into the system! Unfortunately, in 
many instances, the quantitative effort of these deficiencies can only be defined once the 
system is fielded and supported.  The specific requirements and specification activities 




b. Participant vs. Spectator/Consultant  
The logistician's early involvement should be as a participant and not as a 
spectator or consultant:  Presence is not participation.  A general analysis of the data 
indicates that many programs are in a mode of correcting fundamental flaws in the 
logistics-compatibility of the hardware design or fundamental defects in the structure of 
the logistics support system.  Collectively, these two flaws of design and planning 
ultimately predestine whether or not future O&S Costs will be reasonable or excessive.  
The evidence points toward the general lack of participatory involvement by highly 
experienced, professional logisticians who have the skills to avoid major supportability 
mistakes during the conceptual phase.  The data seems to suggest the following typical 
scenario: 
  An Advanced Concept and Technology Demonstration (ACTD) or 
“advanced concept” program in one of the Service’s research and engineering 
centers is being formulated with an immature requirements document on an 
austere budget.  The leader contacts the loggies just to make sure their in-the-
loop so he can check the coordination block in a program status report or 
briefing slide.  The logistics organization assigns a single generalist or staffer to 
attend meetings and provide input when asked (spectator/consultant).  A couple 
of years “rocks” along, the program passes the point where 70% of the life-cycle 
cost is already predestined, the program “enters validation/demonstration” and 
a Chief Logistician and a couple of other logisticians, who don’t realize that 
most of their latitude to substantially influence costs has already passed, are 
hired to “concurrently engineer” the system for supportability during the 
development phase.   
Consequently, in a manner similar to how a Calvinist adapts his behavior to be 
consistent with his theology, a logistician must adapt his behavior to be consistent with 
the revelation of the Law of Pre-destination of O&S Costs.  The logistician must be a 
Genesis 1:1 participant who’s future commendation should read…. “In the beginning, 
this logistician helped create a design and support system that optimized logistics support 
while minimizing life-cycle costs.”  The key words are “beginning” and “create” and it 
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results from early participation, (not consultation) and involves creating (not reacting to) 
a logistics support system.  The logistics participants should be a highly-technical and 
seasoned team of logisticians with excellent maintainability engineering & planning 
skills.  A complete analysis of these needed skills will be explored in future paragraphs. . 
c. Persistent Proactivity  
The Chief Logistician must be highly proactive in diplomatically 
involving himself in the new-start activity while not being guilty of  "Crashing the Party" 
or "Waiting for an Invitation."  Since logisticians are generally last on the list of Who’s 
Who in assembling a new-start team, the logistician genuinely desiring to do the right 
thing faces a formidable obstacle in gaining the needed participatory status.  Again, 
timing is everything.  If the invitation is too late (the usual norm), then the logistician 
cannot substantially affect the outcome.  If the logistician crashes the party, he risks 
alienation from the allies he desperately needs.  The leadership of the logistics 
organization must be cognizant of all new-start activity and ensure that the program 
leadership has logistics involvement during the conception of the program.  Being 
specifically invited to participate establishes the authority and credibility that is critically 
needed at this point of maximum pre-destination. 
3. Develop Realistic Expectations  
This law of pre-destination has a major implication for reducing ownership and 
O&S Costs in today’s environment dominated by fielded weapon systems:  Adjust 
expectations based on the weapon system life-cycle phase.  Recognize the inertia of the 
Law of Predestination of O&S Costs.  If your system is in production or is fielded, 
bonafide major reductions of ownership costs should not be expected.  When reviewing 
the data of new O&S Costs reduction achievements for fielded systems, the list of 
achievements are short in number and low on cost savings.  Many are merely rectifying 
previous design or planning mistakes and claiming the corrective actions as a success in 
ownership cost reduction.  Correcting past mistakes are not really bonafide O&S 
improvements; they’re an expenditure of additional dollars to correct a flaw that should 
have been prevented.  Sadly, this is the point where most of DOD is trending water today.  
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Major emphasis on ownership and O&S Costs reduction has met with limited success.  
Great intentions but the gods of O&S pre-destination have thwarted their good works. 
4. Overcoming the Law of Pre-destination of O&S Costs   
The data indicates that the Law of Pre-destination of O&S Costs can be overcome 
under one general approach.  Interestingly, this approach is simply a reincarnation of the 
model at a different level.  When reviewing the limited number of success stories where 
significant O&S reductions have been made on fielded systems, the common 
denominator is that they re-designed the system or support structure.  Reliability and 
maintainability design changes, at a sub-system level, are by far the most common design 
initiatives to reduce O&S Costs for fielded systems and are often executed by "block 
modifications.”  Effectively, these design changes return the clock of the life-cycle 
commitment model back to near-zero.  Future life-cycle costs are pre-determined during 
the conceptual phase as an engineering change.  Consequently, the Law of Predestination 
is still in-effect, but at a lower-level via a modification activity.  Now, since the system is 
fielded and an adequate logistics staff is ready, willing, and able, logistics requirements 
have top-billing and good supportability decisions are usually made to pre-determine 
future costs.  However, the effect of these reincarnation efforts at a lower-level do not 
appear to have the same patterns of “commitment of life-cycle cost” and “life-cycle costs 
actually expended” as listed in the original model.  Because of the cost of changing 
fielded hardware, the data suggests that the “gap” between the curves compresses 
considerably.  More life-cycle costs are expended at an earlier time frame (due to 
investment requirements) and the escalation rate of the upper curve (life-cycle cost 
commitment) is lower (due to lower impacts of decisions made).  Still, the Law of 
Predestination can be overcome on fielded systems by making sub-system design 
changes with proven returns-on-investment.  
5. Recognition that Choices have Consequences   
The fundamental reason we have an inventory of weapon system’s with excessive 
O&S Costs is that we made a conscious decision to do so.  Excessive O&S Costs didn’t 
evolve from the primordial soup of materiel acquisition; they were created by conscious 
choices made by acquisition officials during the early stages of the program.  Most of the 
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fielded systems today were developed and produced in an environment where 
supportability issues were systematically given a lower priority than technical 
performance, cost, or schedule.  Logisticians were outside the sequential engineering 
process and operated in the reactive and corrective modes.  Logistics resources were 
consistently robbed to pay for cost over-runs experienced while achieving technical 
performance objectives.  Supportability tasks and needs were routinely traded-off or 
postponed due to seemingly more urgent priorities.  Since the severity of future events 
(support) could easily be manipulated through optimistic cost estimating, acquisition 
officials could conveniently justify the present prioritization of development and 
production.  “Let’s just built a lot of these things that work well and we’ll figure-out how 
to support it later.”  Many naively believed that the times of plentiful procurement 
funding would carry-over into the supportability phase and the perpetual flow of new 
money would eventually solve the logistics woes.  The net consequence of these past 
choices are weapon systems whose ownership cost is substantially greater that it should 
be.  Tragically, as other analysis in this Thesis will show, due to the criticality of timing 
in the strategic reduction of ownership costs, it’s really too late to efficiently remedy 
these past practices.  We are stuck with excessive ownership costs on most fielded 
systems.  The seasoned logistician can now say:  “I told you so.”  Those who made these 
choices two decades ago are without excuse.  The logistical consequences of these 
practices were well-documented in the past.  The decision-makers choose technical 
performance and its cost at the expense of support and we must now learn how to deal 
with the consequences.  The principal lesson learned is to not repeat the same strategic 
mistakes on new-start systems.   
6. Ensure Adequate Logistics Weight in Source Selection Criteria   
Some of the defects in the logistics design and support structure of the studied 
systems indicate that logistics carried little significance in the over-all weighting of the 
source selection criteria when the original prime contractor was chosen.  Technical 
performance criteria were weighted so heavily that the source selected which was the one 
which optimized system performance at the expense of supportability.  Consequently, 
contractors were “rewarded” for sacrificing logistics considerations based on what the 
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Government defined as the most important performance and cost characteristics in the 
original selection criteria.  An interesting historical study would be to compare the 
logistics weighing in source selection criteria of currently fielded major systems to the 
rate of current O&S expenditures.  This author predicts that the fundamental conclusion 
would be that "we've got exactly what we choose"…excessive O&S Costs.  Finally, this 
analysis indicates that the Chief Logistician must maintain a balanced and reasonable 
perspective on the role of the prime contractor.  The contractor is in business to make a 
profit consistent with the American free-enterprise system.  The logistician’s challenge is 
to ensure that this profit role is directly correlated to key logistics design factors with the 
appropriate incentives to achieve these goals.  If the contractor achieves high 
supportability objectives, then the contract should adequately reward the contractor with 
higher profitability. 
C. DESIGN ROLES   
1. Logistics Engineers as Active Participants in the System Engineering  
Process   
The absolute prerequisite for achieving a logistics-friendly design is for the 
logistics engineer to be an active participant in the over-all system engineering process.  
Logistics engineers must first be qualified to participate (covered in another section of 
this analysis).  Given qualified logistics engineers, the person must be fully engaged in 
the systems engineering process with the skill to satisfy all of the logistics requirements 
through design activities, the diplomacy to resolve numerous trade-offs that are an 
inevitable part of any program, and the vision to articulate the cause and effect 
relationships of design options to future execution of the support system.  The critical 
processes and maintenance planning sections of the research collaborate these inter-
related roles and point toward a needed improved stature of the Chief Logistician in the 
PM team, particularly in terms of technical competence. 
2. Role of “Definition” instead of “Influence”   
The thrust of academic literature identifies the logistician’s principal role as one 
of “influencing design” for supportability.  The data indicates that this "influencing" role 
has failed to accomplish it’s intended objectives.  The underlying reason our track record 
for supportability design is so poor is that we have been "attempting to influence" when 
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we should be "striving to define".  This subtle difference is more than semantics; it is a 
cultural change in the way a logistician should behave in the acquisition community.  The 
ability to influence is directly proportional to the individual’s position, status, or prestige.  
Unfortunately, since the logistician has historically not possessed as high a position, 
status, or prestige as the other more-prominent members of the acquisition populous, it is 
no surprise that low influence has resulted in low accomplishments.  Changing the 
logistician’s status to a definition role where he can precisely prescribe the supportability 
specifications is a key choice for the acquisition leadership.  Without this cultural change 
in the logistician’s position, an influence-only role will only perpetuate sub-par 
performance.  The specific characteristics of this needed "definition role" will be 
analyzed in another section. 
3. Preeminence of Support “Requirements”   
Although “design” seems to receive top-billing as the single most important task 
for logisticians, the data indicates that “requirements” must be the preeminent function of 
the logistics community if they are to strategically reduce ownership costs.  In the 
acquisition world, the design is a function of the requirement.  Consequently, the 
fundamental way that a logistician defines the design characteristics is through 
establishing the necessary logistics requirements.  The gut reaction to this point by the 
acquisition community is that requirements are the combat developer’s responsibility and 
not the materiel developer’s.  Partially true.  The materiel developer has the responsibility 
to ensure that the combat developer includes reasonable, achievable, sensible, and 
affordable requirements.  From the data, it appears that logisticians have not been 
successful in incorporating logistics requirements into requirements documentation.  If 
they had been successful, the design would reflect the requirements.  From a quick 
review of specific systems, the principal problems appear to be following: 
a. Insufficient Numbers of Requirements 
Many systems tend to have only a handful of basic logistics 
requirements.  A few Mean-Times (between failure/to repair/between maintenance 
actions), a Bit-Effectiveness measure, and maybe a transportability measure are the 
typical number of limited measures of supportability design.  Although requirements 
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should be tailored to the specific system and should be fully justified, the data suggests 
that excessive O&S Costs are occurring because the non-existent requirement failed to 
drive the necessary logistical-efficient design.  Requirements documents for major 
systems should contain an extensive list of supportability design requirements.  In many 
cases, the requirements author may not have the expertise to know what logistics 
requirements are necessary and how to express those requirements with specific terms.  
The Chief Logistician in the materiel developer world must identify these deficiencies 
and convince the combat developer to include the proper number of logistics 
requirements. 
b. Measurable Requirements   
The data suggests that many logistics needs are not met because 
the requirement was expressed in qualitative and not quantitative terms.  "Optimizing, 
maximizing, or minimizing" a specific design feature is an exercise in relativity in which 
the nebulous design characteristic can easily be lost in significance to quantifiable 
performance criteria.  The qualitative terms are too common in logistics requirements 
documents.  With the advent of performance specifications, the definition of logistics 
requirements has become more difficult since they must often be measured in the 
dynamic environment of operations and support. 
c. Defendable Requirements   
Possibly the underlying reason that logistics requirements are so 
scarce is that they cannot be defended and are scratched from the requirements 
documentation.  The well-intentioned, but many times ill-equipped, author of logistics 
requirements must be capable of discriminating between requirements and preferences, 
estimating the influence the requirement has on future logistics efficiency and 
effectiveness, and negotiating trade-offs with other competing needs of the program.   
d. Critical Requirements   
Identifying a core group of critical logistics requirements is 
impossible to define since one-shoe-doesn't-fit all systems.  However, from the research,  
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the following requirements consistently appear and should form a core group of critical 
requirements for most logistics programs. 
Built-in Test Effectiveness   Mean Time To Restore System 
Direct Man-Hours Per Maintenance Action Mission Reliability 
False Alarm Rate    Operational Availability  
Fault Isolation    Reliability Growth 
Inherent Availability    Service Life 
Integrated Diagnostics   Software Error Rate 
Maintenance Event Time   Software Maintainability 
Mean Time Between Failure   Stock Availability 
Mean Time to Repair    Turnaround Time 
4. Stroking the King and Queen of Supportability Design   
Numerous supportability design requirements are important.  However, the 
undisputed king and queen of supportability design areas are reliability and 
maintainability, respectively.  Of the more than 100 initiatives noted for the 12 
researched systems, approximately 65% of those initiatives were either reliability or 
maintainability initiatives. 
a. Reliability  
As the king of supportability design, reliability fundamentally determines 
the demand for logistics.  With high reliability, there is little demand for logistics.  
Conversely, with low reliability, the demand for logistics increases exponentially.  
Unfortunately, reliability is not directly a domain of the logistician’s responsibility.  
Consequently, the very item that most dramatically affects the demand for logistics is not 
even under the control of person it most affects.  Therefore, logistics engineers must 
partner with their counterparts in reliability engineering and collectively define and 
allocate reliability requirements affecting logistics throughout the system.  From the data, 
it appears that many systems limited the definition of reliability requirements at too high 
a level and did not allocate down to the maintenance-significant items.  All items 
replaceable at levels above depot maintenance should have a Mean-Time-Between-
Failure (MTBF) requirement.  Additionally, the logistician must lobby the reliability 
community to invest in ultra-reliable technology.  One of the key goals of the logistics  
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community should be the development of such highly-reliable items that the Level of 
Repair Analysis (LORA) should conclude it is more cost-effective to discard the item on 
its rare failure than to construct a logistics tail to support the item.  The ultra-reliability 
initiatives (e.g., nano-technologies, microelectronics, biometrics) have great potential to 
reduce or eliminate the demand for logistics and the corresponding reductions in 
ownership costs.  Finally, the research indicates that reliability efforts should focus on a 
core group of items.  Seven of the 12 systems studied indicated that 60% to 70% of total 
O&S Costs are attributable to six to 12 key items.   
b. Maintainability   
As the queen of supportability design, maintainability fundamentally 
determines the ability to perform logistics.  While reliability determines frequency, 
maintainability determines capability.  From a review of maintenance activities in the 
studied systems, maintainability design characteristics appear marginal.  Mediocre 
testability, modularity, and lack of interchangeability are frequently mentioned symptoms 
of the real root cause: a marginal maintainability design.  For the logistics engineer, 
maintainability presents another dilemma in responsibility.  As a move to consolidate the 
Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) functions into one focal group, 
many reliability organizations (located in the Research, Development, & Engineering 
Center) have the fundamental responsibility of maintainability engineering.  These RAM 
organizations have limited logistics skills and logistical knowledge and seem to spend 
90% of their time on reliability and the balance on availability and maintainability.  
Under this scenario and similar to the reliability responsibilities mentioned previously, 
the logistics engineer may be in the same predicament of not being directly responsible 
for a critical activity.  The maintenance engineering area in the commodity command's 
logistics center must be very proactive in fulfilling this engineering void. 
5. Design for Maintainability   
The thrust of the logistics engineer’s effort should be focused on designing the 
system for maintainability.  While other logistics disciplines are very important in the 
logistical engineering effort (e.g., human factors, transportability, interchangeability), 
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designing the system for maintainability is the actual beginning point in creating a 
logistics-effective design.  The key decisions in this process are as follows: 
a. An Open System Architecture   
The current buzz-phrase of weapon system design involves designing the 
system to readily accept hardware and software changes.  All eight of the fielded systems 
studied mentioned at least one maintainability problem, which was difficult to correct due 
to architectural-design problems.  Most fundamental maintainability problems, 
particularly in the area of modifications, are directly attributable to the lack of a fluid 
open system architecture.  This concept of an open approach to the system architecture is 
absolutely necessary to executing future maintainability and modification improvements 
in that it simplifies the interfaces, integration, and application of Line Replacement Unit 
(LRU) changes, particularly Horizontal Technology Insertion (HTI) and Modernization 
Through Spares (MTS) initiatives.  Open architecture is being practiced on most of the 
new weapons programs.  All four developmental systems studied in this Thesis are 
pursuing an open-architecture design.  
b. Modularity and Accessibility   
Closely aligned to an open systems architecture is modularity, the degree 
to which items can to interchanged at various levels of support.  This generic term may 
be the single most influential factor in maintainability design.  All 12 systems studied 
mentioned modularity as either an inhibitor to effective maintenance (fielded systems) or 
as a key design goal (developmental systems).  Modularity creates the ability to perform 
maintenance and repair by allowing simplified assembly, disassembly, and exchange.  
Modularity is the principal catalyst for allowing most modification activities to execute 
efficiently, particularly for reliability and maintainability improvements for O&S Costs 
reduction.  Finally, modularity is absolutely essential for Horizontal Technology Insertion 
(HTI) and Modernization Through Spares (MTS).  The first cousin of modularity is 
accessibility.  Even though the item may be modular, if the item is not easily accessible to 
the maintainer at the prescribed level of maintenance, the ability to capitalize on the 
benefits of modularity is severely diminished.  Line Replacement Units (LRUs) must be 
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designed whereby they are easily accessible without the use of special tools, procedures, 
or any other uncharacteristic maintenance practice. 
c. Testability   
One of the principal root causes for a supply chain filled with good parts, 
that are believed to be bad, is testability.  Five of the 12 systems studied specifically 
noted major testability improvement programs.  A recurring problem in maintainability 
design is failing to design the item for proper testability at the proper level of 
maintenance.  Ineffective built-in test, poor diagnostics, inadequate fault isolation, and a 
variety of other testability problems result in a bulging supply chain of unnecessary 
repairs.  Furthermore, test equipment and software-intensive test program sets are 
constantly changing and tend to provoke a testability environment of chaos.  The 
feedback loop from the support system to the materiel developer is constantly filled with 
technical testability problems, suggested engineering changes, and clarifications over 
procedural issues.  In many cases, the fundamental problem is improper or dysfunctional 
test equipment.  
D.        PLANNING ROLES 
1. Focus on Maintenance Planning, not Supply Support   
Contrary to the apparent belief system of the Service’s “materiel” commands, 
maintenance (not supply) is the backbone of the support system.  The research shows that 
logistics efficiency and effectiveness flow from a maintenance plan.  Yet a tremendous 
degree of effort is being invested in maintaining visibility of parts, accelerating their 
movement, shrinking supply footprints, and reducing their procurement times.  The 
culture seems to suggest that “if we throw enough parts at our logistics problems we’re 
bound to solve the problem sooner or later.”  In reality, the cancer that eats away at the 
body of most of the support systems that were studied is the poorly-constructed 
maintenance plan.  Four of the studied fielded systems indicated problems with the basic 
maintenance plan.  Sadly, many fielded systems are still discussing “maintenance 
concepts” which is simply an indication that a developmental intention has never matured 
into an actual reality.  Others are “modifying maintenance concepts” as an admission that 
the previously-conceived plan was wrong and inoperable.  Constant shifting of the 
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maintenance levels (i.e., organizational, direct, intermediate, depot) for replacing and 
repairing of maintenance-significant items are very common.  This instability results in 
unnecessary expenditures due to constantly changing the multitude of affected resources 
(e.g., publications, training, parts, stockage levels).  Aside from the various design 
activities discussed in previous paragraphs, the key “planning” activity of the logistics 
community is to properly structure a coherent, stable, and executable maintenance plan 
for the system.  However, the importance of maintenance planning (as opposed to supply 
support) varies by weapon system.  Systems with simplistic maintenance concepts (e.g., 
exchange of LRUs only) should place significantly more importance on the design and 
execution of the supply system.  Examples of six specific maintenance deficiencies noted 
in the research materiel are the following: 
a. Un-testable Items   
To identify the need for repair, the correct condition of the item must be 
clearly defined.  The root cause of most of the No Evidence Of Failure (NEOF) 
population of parts in the supply system is a dysfunctional test and failure-identification 
system.  BIT-effectiveness must be excellent and comprehensive.  Often, many BIT-
effectiveness measurement techniques ignore certain populations of failure modes (e.g., 
wring connection).  In other instances, a high BIT-effectiveness rating may disguise 
many failures because they are not even tested, are not considered in the effectiveness 
calculation, and therefore can give a false and very misleading impression of the 
testability of the over-all system.  Finally, defect criteria for mechanical devices (which 
are not BIT-testable) must be unambiguous.  The Chief Logistician should always ask the 
contractor to quantify all failure modes that are not testable, qualify their effort and 
criticality to the system, and define what techniques will be employed to mitigate their 
impact to system performance. 
b. Misallocated Levels of Maintenance   
The maintenance is performed at the wrong level.  The requirements at a 
specified level must not exceed the skills of the maintainer.  Furthermore, the complete 
portfolio of resources (tools, test equipment, facilities, etc) must be reasonably and 
practicably available.  Often, the materiel developer and contractor's analysis fail to 
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properly assess the realities of the military's maintenance environment and fields a 
maintenance plan that is not executable.  In particular, there must be adequate time for 
the maintainer to devote the necessary effort to the maintenance requirements. 
c. Inadequate Maintenance Training   
A few instances were noted in researching the specific O&S initiatives of 
weapon systems in which poor maintenance training appeared to be the root cause.  
Excessive preventive maintenance tasks are inherently a tactical procedural mistake and a 
strategic doctrinal mistake.  Unnecessary maintenance, although motivated by important 
reliability-centered maintenance doctrine, only creates expenditures in the area most 
susceptible to O&S Costs increases: military personnel.  Since military pay constitutes 
the highest percentage of O&S Costs, seemingly minor increases in task requirements 
results in exponential increases of military pay cost when multiplied by hundreds of 
systems and people.  Finally, the research suggests that the related issue of "skills" is also 
a significant problem.  Often, the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) does not 
provide individuals with the sufficient knowledge, skills, and abilities to execute the 
planned tasks.     
d. Inadequate Maintenance Procedures   
Closely allied with poor training is poor maintenance procedures.  With 
poor procedures, improper troubleshooting is common and “good” items are coded as 
unserviceable.  Additionally, operator-induced failures are common because of 
deficiencies in procedural narratives.  Furthermore, the advent of electronic procedures, 
via Integrated Electronic Technical Manuals (IETMs), have resulted in both major 
improvements and new headaches.  Drawings, schematics, and other data are more 
difficult to read electronically versus hardcopy.  The normal human preferences with 
using and following a hardcopy are difficult to overcome.  To be a true O&S Costs 
reduction measure, new state-of-the-art procedures must solve many more problems than 
they create. 
e. Underachievement of Maintenance Times   
A common problem seems to be a pattern of exceeding the planned mean-
times-to-repair, the mean time to troubleshoot & test, and other maintenance time 
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measures.  If patterns of excessive time persist, the military simply improvises with 
shortcuts and workarounds, which circumvent the maintenance, plan and ultimately lead 
to excessive O&S Cost growth.  Next-higher-assemblies, containing good sister 
subassemblies, are turned-in for repair.  Demands for readiness during extended 
maintenance times drives the local unit to stocking excessive parts, resorting to 
cannibalization, implementing extensive “controlled substitution,” and re-allocating 
additional personnel to these burdensome maintenance requirements at the expense of 
other areas.  Strategically, the reduced confidence in the maintenance plan and the 
resulting preventive and corrective measures generate an irreversible growth in the 
logistics tail of the system.   
f. Attention to Maintenance – Significant Items   
An obvious trend in the data is for a few items to represent the majority of 
O&S Costs.  In two systems studied, a single item was 20% to 30% of the total O&S 
hardware cost for the entire system!  Furthermore, as few as a dozen items may represent 
60% to 80% of the total parts costs.  Strategic R-TOC efforts must focus on these and 
other cost drivers as the critical maintenance items.  After reliability efforts on these 
items have minimized their demand for maintenance, the insightful maintenance planners 
should spend the majority of their time on these handfuls of items.  Design characteristics 
of modularity, accessibility, and testability must be absolutely validated.  Resources to 
execute maintenance at the prescribed level must be defined and proven.  Sensitivity 
analysis must be conducted at all levels with realistic assumptions of what could (and 
will) go wrong with the maintenance plan and how resilient the maintenance plan is to 
the inability to achieve skill levels, testability goals, time requirements, and a host of 
other factors.    
2. Right “Fit” into Service’s Logistics Systems   
Somewhat independent of weapons system ownership cost reduction efforts are a 
wide variety of O&S initiatives that are general in nature and apply to multiple systems 
and commodities.  Initiatives such as Focused Logistics, Wholesale Logistics 
Modernization, Lean Logistics, and Total Asset Visibility have excellent prospects for 
substantial savings within the Service provided the various program office’s insure their 
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systems and support plans are designed and constructed to be compatible with the 
requirements of these generalized initiatives.  However, the proponents for these two 
categories of efforts are in two entirely separate chains of command.  The weapon 
system-specific initiatives are being led by the various project managers in the Program 
Executive Office (PEO) chain while the general initiatives are being led the three 
Service’s materiel and logistics commands.  Consequently, to exploit the full potential of 
these similar efforts, the two camps must completely coordinate and cooperate with each 
other.  Currently, this cooperation appears to be only voluntary and motivated by a 
common desire to collectively reduce ownership costs.  However, since there are few 
actual requirements to make similar efforts compatible with each other, the prospects of 
sub-optimizing the general and system-specific cost reductions efforts appear to be highly 
likely.  To bridge this gap, the Chief Logistician must fully understand the general 
initiative and then export these needs into the design and plans of his specific system.  
When there are additional costs to change the specific system to adapt to a general 
initiative of one of the Services, the Chief Logistician must ensure the requirement is 
clearly identified, the resources quantified, and the decision-maker is equipped with the 
information to make an informed decision.  The funding responsibility should be shared 
by both parties since it provides mutual benefit.  Finally, there is often a dichotomy 
between the acquisition policies of the various Services and statutory requirements (e.g., 
Prime Vendor Support vs. Break-out Contracting/Small Disadvantaged Business).  The 
Chief Logistician must strike a delicate balance between these very important constraints.   
3. Selecting the Correct Contractor Logistics Support  
Possibly the most common initiative being pursued across the Services and 
various programs is some form of contractor responsibility for a large segment of the 
support system.  All twelve systems studied indicated some form of contractor logistics 
support and four of the systems are either using or considering system-wide contractor 
support.  The leadership directives and revised acquisition policies are littered with the 
buzz words of Prime Vendor Support, Total System Performance Responsibility, Fleet 
Management, and Contractor Logistics Support.  All point to the same conclusion: 
contractors should have a major role in supporting the systems they produce.  The 
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wisdom of this strategic shift remains mixed.  Advocates tend to be Project Managers 
who see contractors as possessing the innovation to revolutionize a hopelessly 
bureaucratic and inefficient organic support system.  Detractors tend be the Service 
materiel and logistics commands who see the organic system as equally capable of 
innovation and are very suspicious of the possibility of greater contractor cost over the 
long-term due to sole-source arrangements.  While the advent of performance 
specifications is essentially forcing contractor support in many instances, the Chief 
Logistician must remain an honest broker in this evolving food-fight and consider all 
factors in making his life-cycle support recommendations to the Project Manager.  While 
the existing literature on this subject has excellent rules on considering contractor 
support, the following analytical ideas are presented which directly relate to the decisions 
made in the strategic reduction of O&S Costs. 
a. Enter into Contractor Support by Choice, not by Default   
Within many program offices, it appears that contractor support is being 
pursued by default rather than by choice.  For example, while performance specifications 
for new systems makes development of organic support difficult, they do not make it 
impossible or even improbable.  The existing bureaucratic nature of the organic 
infrastructure and methodologies makes innovation challenging; it does not make it 
impractical.  Entering into contractor support should be a conscious choice made from an 
objective analysis of the facts, not as an excuse to avoid difficulties and frustrations of a 
naturally-bureaucratic organic philosophy.   
b. "New Starts” are where Contractor Support is Most Easily 
Executable  
 
Converting fielded systems to contractor support is costly, time-
consuming, resource-draining, and politically-challenging.  The total return on 
investment is usually not worth the trouble.  Cost comparisons considering the 
conversion usually ignore the previous investments into organic support that are 
essentially wasted when organic support is abandoned for contractor support.  
Furthermore, the net impact on the total Service can be devastating (e.g., Apache Prime 
Vendor Support to Army’s Working Capital Fund).  However, conversions of sub-
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systems and LRUs (instead of the total system) in fielded systems are many times very 
executable. 
c. Label Contractor Support for What it Really Is   
The buzz words flying around for the various fads on contractor support 
are usually misleading.  Prime vendor is not one source but usually a consortium of 
contractors and subcontractors/vendors.  Fleet is not really fleet-wide management nor 
does a contractor really have “total system performance responsibility.”  Contractor 
support proposals should objectively define what they’re attempting to accomplish.  
Correctly labeling contractor support provides clarity of purpose, avoids needless 
arguments over implications and hidden agendas, and conserves resources over 
unnecessary debates and studies. 
d. Apply Contractor Support by Maintenance Level  
The support system revolves around the maintenance plan.  Consequently, 
contractor support should be applied based on the maintenance plan as allocated to the 
maintenance level.  The vast majority of contractor support activities are depot-level in 
nature.  The test equipment, facilities, skills, and procedures for depot-level repair at 
organic facilities are essentially the same as exists on the contractor’s production line.  
Consequently, the chief enabler of support (the maintenance plan) is very easily 
established at contractor’s facilities as compared to organic depots.  Once the 
maintenance capability is established, the other logistics elements (e.g., supply, 
transportation, training) easily follow suit.  A key point to remember is that depot-level 
denotes a complexity of support, not the geographic location of that support.  Depot-level 
capabilities can exist at all geographic levels of support from theatre to the individual 
unit.  Many times, the most effective contractor involvement is depot-level support for 
maintenance-significant items tied to readiness needs that can be accomplished by a few 
highly-skilled technicians in forward-deployed areas.  Conversely, contractor support 
becomes far more complicated to execute once you leave the conventional wholesale 
support structure and move forward in the general, direct, and organizational 
maintenance levels of the retail environment.  Logisticians should use great caution in 
developing contractor support in these retail environments. 
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e. Maintain the Proper Business Perspective   
Many contractor initiatives today provide the impression is that all the 
Government needs is a small project office to “over-see” the program, a contracting 
officer to write a check, and the contractor to take care of the rest.  The logisticians 
designing any contractor support approach should be very cautious of the business 
position that a profit-motivated contractor can establish in a sole-source arrangement for 
the system lifetime.  The contractor guys were not asleep during their basic acquisition 
class when the chart showed 60% to 80% of the total life-cycle costs are in the O&S 
phase.  This new-found business opportunity holds enormous profit potential for the 
innovative contractor.  “Buying-in” to a program with reduced development and 
production profitability in exchange for the mother-lode of operation and support 
profitability can become common.  Buyer beware!  
f. Control the Execution of Contractor Support    
To mitigate the business risk of sole-source life-cycle contractor support, 
the Government should strongly consider mechanisms to control the contractor support.  
The most common method is the GOCO approach:  Government-Owned Contractor-
Operated.  The Government owns some or all of the capabilities and the contractor 
provide the manpower and skills.  In essence, the contractor provides the "brains" and the 
Government provides the "brawn."  Not only does this approach mitigate risk but the 
approach may also significantly reduce cost.  For example, the Government may provide 
the depot-level facilities at no cost and the contractor can substantially reduce his 
overhead rates of expensive in-plant charges.  Test equipment, tooling, and fixturing can 
be procured by the Government and furnished to the contractor who operates and 
maintains the equipment.  Regardless of the approach taken in a particular system, the net 
effect should be to mitigate risk and reduce cost. 
g. Measure and Incentivize Performance   
The contractor’s performance must be measured by criteria that are 
directly applicable to the specific type of contractor support.  One shoe does not fit all.  
Logisticians must take care to tailor metrics to the exact result that needs to be measured 
and incentivized.  Furthermore, the metric needs to be clearly within the contractor’s 
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scope of responsibility and authority.  Many contractor support arrangements are 
attempting to contract for such metrics as readiness and stock availability, which directly 
and indirectly depend on Government/military organizations and activities. 
h. Performance-Based vs. Traditional Support   
The advent of performance specifications have driven PMs to buy an 
outcome-based, performance-driven support from prime contractors.  This approach is 
the antithesis of the traditional multi-contractor organic support structure developed over 
numerous years under the MIL-STD-1388 "Logistics Support Analysis" process.  This 
strategic disconnect results in many PMs planning a support structure that is totally 
reliant upon a single prime contractor, often under a sole-source long-term contracting 
agreement.  This prime-exclusive support arrangement carries the possibility of 
significant cost growth, a single methodology of support, a single mindset for innovation, 
and a multitude of other risky behaviors inherent with placing all of your marbles in one 
basket.   
4. Develop a Business-based Support System  
From an over-all review of the ongoing design and planning activities for O&S 
Costs reduction, one common theme emerges that is often overlooked by logisticians in 
designing the system and planning the support structure.  The missing theme is the need 
for a support system that compliments the business-based realities of the how the military 
operates today.  Under the new working capital funds, the basic business responsibility 
for the management of parts has been shifted from the materiel developer to the local 
military commander.  Now, the military must make smart business decisions in a world 
of limited financial resources with almost unlimited alternatives.  Over-all readiness 
becomes an affordability issue.  The decisions to perform maintenance and order parts 
becomes a trade-off of perceived return on investment.  Needed maintenance, but with a 
low return on investment, is often postponed or cancelled.  Cannibalization and 
controlled substitution of parts is rampant.  Unauthorized maintenance is often 
accomplished by guess work and trial-and-error in attempts to perform depot-level 
repairs in an organizational or direct support environment.  Available funding is often 
diverted to pay for critical base operation support bills. All of these activities are 
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motivated by the inevitable challenges of managing a financially-based business.  
Logisticians must understand that the winds of change have been completely reversed.  
For the fielded systems today, their logistics systems were constructed against the 
backdrop of a “free issue” parts system.  Since parts were free, the military requirements 
drove maintenance away from the front lines and back toward depot-level.  Maintainable 
items were consolidated in extremely-extensive “black box” LRUs and simply evacuated 
to general or depot support facilities for repair.  Units stocked large quantities of free 
parts at the organizational and direct support levels to maintain readiness through virtual 
unlimited supply.  Expectantly, abuses were common.  In reaction, the defense 
department has indirectly given the military the procurement responsibility for parts 
through the working capital funds.  Since the military must now pay for the parts (instead 
of being “free”), the “winds of maintenance needs” have completely reversed themselves.  
Now, maintenance has been driven forward.  The military needs a maintenance design 
that focuses on the lowest-cost part that can be exchanged at the farthest point forward.  
For example, the $2,000 circuit card that was once exchanged at general support or 
depot-level is now needed to be replaced at organizational or direct support.  The 
accompanying logistics tail for this seemingly-simple move is staggering.  The 
maintainable design characteristics of the hardware must be changed.  Greatly improved 
test equipment is needed, more detailed procedures must be developed, and smarter 
solders must be trained.  In summary, the architects of future logistics systems must use 
this business-based reality as an underlying theme of all proposed design and planning 
activities for the reduction in ownership cost for this type of logistics system.  Under 
“operationalizing acquisition” initiatives, the role of the military in business affairs will 
almost certainly increase in responsibility and authority. 
5. Correctly Select Commercial Items 
While commercially-available, non-developmental items have always been a 
preferred acquisition approach, their role in reducing O&S Costs remains suspect.  For 
every success story, there are numerous logistical headaches.  Proprietary data usually 
precludes the establishment of a Government-performed or controlled support system.  
Cost growth from a sole source of repair is common.  Constant changes, fueled by a 
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private-sector motivation to chase the state-of-the-art, generates continuous logistical 
changes.  While performance specifications have mandated the use of commercial items 
in many circumstances, the logistician must use both scientific and artistic analyses in 
determining whether or not commercial items are the most conducive to the strategic 
reduction of ownership costs.  Many times, the long-term consequences of the loss of 
Government control are difficult to quantify.  Unfortunately, since the degree of 
commercialization is usually pre-determined at source selection, the logisticians must 
define these advantages and disadvantages extremely early in the acquisition process. 
E. INHIBITORS  
1. Overview  
The research indicates a wide variety of factors that inhibit the Project Manager 
and Chief Logistician from reducing O&S Costs.  The impact of each inhibitor tends to 
vary by the current state in the system's life-cycle.  New-start and development systems 
have much wider latitude with changes, since they do have established O&S funds, 
operating relationships, structural mechanisms, and other factors.   
2. Specific Inhibitors 
The following eight major inhibitors were noted in the research data.  For each 
inhibitor, the principal problem is described and an analysis of suggested actions is 
presented. 
a. Clear Definition of PM's Role  
Problem:  The PM's specific role remains unclear.  Is the PM's total life-
cycle role a "management" or "cost" responsibility?  Some policy memorandums define 
the PM’s responsibility as a life-cycle management responsibility while others focus on 
simply a cost reduction responsibility.  Additionally, how can the PM be responsible for 
costs, particularly in the sustainment phase of the life-cycle, for which the PM has limited 
ability to manage or control. 
Analysis:  A distinction should be made between “manage” and 
“influence.”  The PM's role should be to a) manage those costs that can be identified and 
controlled within the PMs assigned responsibility and authority and b) influence those 
costs outside of the PMs assigned responsibility and authority.  Specifically, the PM 
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should be held accountable for those R-TOC costs for which the PM can reasonably 
manage.  These "manageable" costs should be included in the key program management 
documentation and should be measured at milestone reviews.  Manageable costs could 
include activities currently managed by the Services’ major subordinate commands (e.g., 
depot maintenance).  However, the PM should still be held accountable for R-TOC, 
which can be "influenced" by PM managerial decisions.  For example, the PM can 
"manage" the cost of achieving a Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) rating for a piece 
of developmental hardware which directly "influences" the extent of Military Personnel 
costs required to support varying degrees of labor given different MTBF.  Key 
"influential" R-TOC factors and criteria should be included in the PM’s metrics and 
should quantify the estimated impact to system-specific O&S Costs for which the PM can 
only  “influence." 
b. PM Control Of System-Specific O&S Funding 
Problem:  The lack of PM control of system-specific O&S funding is 
probably the greatest single inhibitor to R-TOC.  Until the PM has the responsibility and 
authority for system-specific O&S funding, the desired effect of optimizing system 
performance while minimizing the cost of ownership through a life-cycle management 
approach cannot be realized. 
Analysis:  The leadership must a) identify the System-Specific O&S Costs 
Elements to be managed by PMs by weapon system, b) develop a cost accounting 
structure for O&S funding that allows planning, programming, budgeting, and execution 
by weapon system to include flexibility for reprogramming of funds and c) develop the 
specific processes and procedures to manage O&S funding by weapon system.  Examples 
of system-specific O&S funding that could be managed by the PM are depot 
maintenance, second destination transportation, and supply depot operations. 
c. Lack Of Good O&S Costs Estimating Models   
Problem:  The lack of good O&S Costs estimating models, with 
accompanying methodology, precludes effective implementation of R-TOC.  Specific 
problems include a) the inability to validate the input data b) the inability to crosswalk 
"estimating" cost elements to "actual" cost elements c) the inability to differentiate 
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between system-specific costs and common, non-system-specific costs (to include end-
item application) and d) the lack of confidence in a forecasting model upon which to 
baseline and measure O&S Costs.  In particular, a validated model is needed for 
including projected O&S metrics in milestone exit criteria for developmental systems. 
Analysis:  The DOD leadership must task the appropriate organizations to 
develop and validate an O&S Costs Estimating Model & Methodology for “Weapon 
Systems” which will include the appropriate elements of existing cost estimating 
databases within the Services.  The model should specifically remedy the  fundamental 
problems listed above. 
d. Lack Of Sufficient Investment  
Problem:  Monumental R-TOC reduction requires substantial investment 
funding.  Numerous systems in the research complain of insufficient investment funding 
to include the inability to retain savings when R-TOC initiatives are successfully 
implemented.  This study clearly indicates that the majority of sustainment costs are 
"predetermined" by developmental and producibility decisions.  Since the majority of our 
systems are already in the sustainment phase of the life-cycle, the PMs have limited 
ability to radically reduce TOC because of limited investment funding to implement key 
materiel modifications and support structure changes. 
Analysis:  The leadership should identify and "fence" additional sources of 
investment funding for the top O&S Costs drivers.  Specific criteria (e.g., return on 
investment, priorities, needs) should be published for obtaining the funds.  Additionally, 
for developmental systems, the leadership should identify additional $RDTE to invest in 
high-payoff opportunities to include those high-potential savings initiatives in which 
specific returns on investment have yet to be identified.  Long term, the leadership should 
consolidate all types of "investment" funding for TOC reduction into a single "pot" and 
stop the proliferation of numerous categories of specialized funding with highly-
restrictive qualification requirements.   
e. Lack Of Specific Guidance On Reducing Military Pay Costs 
Problem:  For many weapon systems, military pay is the largest category 
of O&S Costs.  However, there is little or no emphasis on reducing these costs given the 
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perception that the leadership is not interested in reducing force structure.  Consequently, 
a variety of options of reducing O&S Costs are not being pursued even though they offer 
sizeable savings...but in the wrong categories. 
Analysis:  The leadership should publish specific guidance pertaining to 
O&S initiatives, which reduce manpower requirements, which do not adversely-impact 
force structure levels (e.g., allow re-allocation of manpower to other requirements).  This 
area appears to be the “mother lode” of potential R-TOC, but is not being aggressively 
pursued by many systems. 
f. One-Year $OMA Funding   
Problem:  The one-year nature of $OMA encourages unnecessary 
spending (i.e. use or lose spending) and precludes a variety of managerial options which 
are only executable with multi-year funds. 
Analysis:  The leadership should develop a recommendation to Congress 
(with supporting rationale) that $OMA be changed to two or three-year money to give 
PM’s and Services maximum flexibility is using O&S funds.  Additionally, this change 
should also include reprogramming authority. 
g. Reprogramming Of O&S Funds Into $RDTE And $PROC 
Accounts   
 
Problem:  One of the ultimate goal of R-TOC...modernizing Army 
systems with O&S savings...cannot be fully realized until a clear bridge is developed by 
which O&S savings cannot be reprogrammed into the appropriate $RDTE and $PROC 
accounts.  In particular, a specific PM needs to be "rewarded" for O&S savings by 
allowing the funds to be reprogrammed for modernization initiatives for his/her particular 
system or product line. 
Analysis:  The leadership should develop an additional POM process by 
which O&S savings are directly reprogrammed into $RDTE and $APROC accounts and 
fenced for modernization initiatives for specific weapon systems. 
h. Depot Maintenance Restrictions  
Problem:  Current law limits the amount of depot maintenance, which can 
be contracted to 50%.  Since depot maintenance is one of the largest categories of O&S 
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system-specific funds, which could be controlled by the PMs, this restriction prohibits 
innovative opportunities for contractor depot maintenance. 
Analysis:  The DOD leadership should lobby Congress to remove the 50-
50 Depot Rule and state the need to maintain a mobilization-required organic 
infrastructure based on true national security needs, not an arbitrary 50-50 split. 
F. CHANGES TO THE CHIEF LOGISTICIAN'S STATUS 
1. Overview  
The research data suggests that in order to strategically reduce O&S Costs, the  
Chief Logistician must become somewhat of a superman of acquisition logistics.  The 
range and depths of the person’s expertise to address all of the roles listed in this analysis 
is certainly a formidable challenge.  To accomplish this goal, the analysis suggests the 
following changes listed below. 
2. Knowledge & Ability  
To reduce future O&S Costs during development programs, the research data 
indicates that the Chief Logistician should have a strong technical background.  
Thorough experience in maintainability engineering and maintenance planning is 
required.  An engineering background (experience and/or education) is highly desired.  
To be an impact player with the dominating Chief Engineer and other key PMO leaders 
who are primarily experienced & degreed engineers, the Chief Logistician must have 
technical expertise to debate, negotiate, and resolve key program decisions related to 
logistics.  Credibility is as important as capability.      
3. Availability  
A source or pool of qualified Chief Logisticians and key superbly-trained 
logisticians must be available to provide the talent at the right time.  Preferably, a new-
start systems type of office should provide an institutional base from which to rotate this 
specialized form of logistician in-and-out of these relatively short-term assignments. 
4. Position   
The research indicates that the Chief Logistician lacks the proper position for 
achieving the desired results.  As the "Rodney Dangerfield" of the Acquisition Corps, the 
logistician is often just a salmon swimming up-stream to be eaten by the bears.  The 
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Chief Logistician has a lower status, lower grade and lower organization position 
compared to his counterparts in a typical project office.  These positional inhibitors must 





























V.  CONCLUSIONS  
A. SUMMARY 
The Chief Logistician has a variety of strategic imperatives and key roles in order 
to reduce future O&S Costs.  These imperatives and roles all occur prior to the system’s 
Critical Design Review (CDR) and “predestine” O&S Costs long before they actually 
occur.  A mere knowledge of general acquisition - logistics information is insufficient 
when attempting to reduce future O&S Costs during the development phase.  History  
proves this insufficiency.  To effectively fulfill these strategic imperatives and key roles, 
the Chief Logistician must fully understand their implications to the design of the weapon 
system and planning of the logistics support structure.  Finally, the Chief Logistician 
must recognize the numerous inhibitors to fulfilling these responsibilities as well as his 
difficult occupational position in the typical project office. 
B. STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES  (Secondary Research Question #1) 
“Prior to the CDR, what are the specific strategic imperatives for significant reductions in 
O&S Costs?” 
Answer:  The Chief Logistician must understand the criticality of timing and the 
"Law of Predestination of O&S Costs."  Any time after the concept phase is too late.  The 
involvement must be as a participant and not as a spectator or consultant.  The person 
must develop realistic expectations of O&S Costs reduction possibilities and implement 
specific plans for overcoming the Law of Predestination.  The Chief Logistician must 
recognize that all strategic choices, conscious or otherwise, have major consequences.  In 
particular, the person must ensure that adequate logistics weight is assigned to logistics in 
the source selection process.   
C. KEY DESIGN ROLES (Secondary Research Question #2) 
“Prior to the CDR, what are the key "design" activities of the Chief Logistician required 
to reduce future O&S Costs?” 
Answer:  The Chief Logistician must ensure his staff is actively engaged as 
logistics engineers in the systems engineering process.  The logistics engineers must be in 
a role of defining logistics requirements rather than just influencing the design.  The 
Chief Logistician must understand that defining support requirements is the single most 
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important role and must ensure that they are sufficient, measurable, defendable, and 
critical to logistics success.  The person must maximize the reliability and maintainability 
characteristics of the system.  In particular, the maintainability design must have an open-
system architecture, be highly modular and accessible, and have excellent testability 
characteristics.   
D. KEY PLANNING ROLES (Secondary Research Question #3) 
“Prior to the CDR, what are the key "planning" activities of the Chief Logistician 
required reducing future O&S Costs? 
Answer:  The Chief Logistician must focus on maintenance planning as the 
backbone of the support system, not on supply support.  In particular, the logistician must 
look for key deficiencies in the maintenance plan such as untestable items, misallocated 
levels of maintenance, inadequate maintenance training and procedures, 
underachievement of maintenance times, and lack of attention to maintenance-significant 
items.  The Chief Logistician must ensure his system is compatible with on-going 
Service-directed O&S reduction initiatives.  The selection of the correct type of 
Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) is critical and should be entered by choice not by 
default.  CLS should especially be considered on all “new-starts,” labeled and 
implemented for it’s true intent, and applied by maintenance level based on the 
maintenance concept.  Additionally, the CLS must maintain the proper business 
perspective, be appropriate measured with performance incentives, and should utilize 
Government furnished equipment & facilities where appropriate to mitigate risks and 
reduce costs.  Finally, the key planning roles include a support system that is based on the 
new business realities of the working capital funds as well as the correct selection of 
commercial items.   
E. INHIBITORS (Secondary Research Question #4) 
“What are the principal inhibitors that constrain the Chief Logistician in reducing O&S 
Costs?” 
Answer:  The Chief Logistician faces a comprehensive field of landmines that 
inhibit long-term O&S Costs reduction.  The person’s boss, the Project Manager (PM), 
has an unclear role in R-TOC, hampered by large responsibilities with limited authorities.  
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The PM does not have control of any O&S funding, has marginal O&S Costs estimating 
models, and insufficient investment funding.  Furthermore, there is minimal specific 
guidance on reducing military pay costs, the single largest O&S Cost category.  Finally, 
the restrictions on the usability of $OMA funding (one-year only), the inability to 
reprogram O&S funds to modernization accounts, and the congressional restrictions on 
depot maintenance workloading are highly-complex inhibitors to overcome.   
F. CHIEF LOGISTICIAN'S STATUS (Secondary Research Question #5) 
“What changes can be made to the Chief Logistician’s status during developmental 
programs to enable that person to more effectively reduce future O&S Costs?” 
Answer:  Based on the requirements outlined in this research, the Chief 
Logistician must be an immensely talented individual with unique acquisition logistics 
experience.  The typical Chief Logistician must have unique knowledge and abilities in 
the maintainability engineering and maintenance planning specialties.  Changing the 
Chief Logistics occupational status to a technical position during the developmental 
period is highly desired.  The Chief Logistician needs a ready pool of supporting 
logisticians with the unique skills required for front-end logistics engineering.  The Chief 
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